The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XIII | New York, Saturday, December 29, 1917 | Number 165

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AMERICANS who wish to understand what is taking place in Europe should be grateful to the New York Times for its enterprise in cabling to this country a complete transcript of Lloyd George's recent speech in the House of Commons. The mutilated version which had been cabled through the ordinary news agencies omitted any mention of two of its most significant passages. One of these was the Premier's reference to the attitude of the Allies towards the peace negotiations between the Russian and German governments, which is commented on elsewhere. The other concerns pending negotiations between the British trades-unions and the government, having for their object the release of the latter from pledges made early in the war, which have prevented the military authorities from calling to the colors certain additional men, whose use as soldiers is now deemed to be necessary. The decision to add still further to the size of its armies is an indication of the grim determination of our English associates to omit no precautions and sacrifices which may be necessary to success, and it should spur this country on to follow England's example. The training of additional American troops will not enable the American army to count any more effectively in 1918, but, as we have already pointed out, it is time already to look forward to 1919. The threat of the presence on the firing line during 1919 of over a million Americans rather than half that number would force the German Staff to husband its reserves during the fighting of the coming spring and summer. It is to be hoped that the British government will succeed in obtaining from the trades-unions a release from its pledges, and that the trades-unions will in return secure from the government that modification in its war diplomacy upon the desirability of which the trades-unions leaders have recently been insistent.

"BUT if, through our exhaustion we had to accept the Kaiser's terms [i. e. offensive terms] we would do so to rise with the German people against German militarism." Thus does Trotzky attempt to reassure those who fear that the peace Germany is in a position to impose will prove humiliating to Russia. The underlying reasoning, however, is not very cogent. A German proletarian uprising is probably remote: the German political and military organization has infinitely greater tensile strength than the Russian organization shattered by the revolution. If the German ruling class really feared that such an uprising could make head, supported by Russian forces, they would now be impelled to impose upon Russia terms so drastic as to insure a long period of anarchy and impotence. Russia may obtain from Germany peace terms that are moderate, in view of the collapse of her army. But if she does obtain such terms, it will be solely because the former allies of Russia are keeping up the fight. This fact may dictate moderation to Germany in her dealings with Russia. Russia may refuse to help to secure satisfactory terms of peace for us, but if she gets satisfactory terms for herself, it will be by virtue of the fighting powers of the western nations. And if we are tempted to regret that Russia still profits from our labors, let us

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remember that but for Russia's tremendous sacrifices in the early part of the war, Germany would now be absolutely supreme upon the continent of Europe. And further let us remember that German supremacy may yet be established, however the war goes, unless we help Russia to secure a peace that secures her independence.

AFTER all American talk about the sacrifices America is making for the Allies, the figures produced by Mr. Hoover respecting American consumption of sugar are enough to make Americans feel uncomfortable and look hypocritical. The plain facts are that American consumption of sugar during a period of distressing shortage has at best slightly diminished. Each American consumes over twice as much as each Englishman and almost four times as much as each Frenchman. Surely it is time to deal more drastically with such anomalies—with such overwhelming indications of a refusal or inability on the part of the American to abandon under the shock of war the wasteful indulgence of his ordinary desires. Americans are the most reckless consumers of candies and sweet drinks in the world, and it is this class of consumption which is least necessary and has the smallest food value. Something can be done to diminish the drain made by candy stores and soda water fountains on the sugar supply by an appeal to voluntary effort, but the appeal should be backed up by a power of coercion with which the Food Administration is not now possessed, but which should be granted to it some time in the near future.

WHAT does Senator Reed hope to gain from his studied discourtesy to Mr. Hoover? The committee of which he is a member had elicited from Mr. Spreckels statements that were intended to reflect doubt upon the competence if not the integrity of the service of which Mr. Hoover is the head. Mr. Hoover signified his desire to reply to the implied charges against him, and the American people wanted to hear him. They believe in Mr. Hoover. They do not care especially to have the charges of a disgruntled manufacturer dignified by a serious refutation, but they are interested in anything Mr. Hoover has to say about the Food Administration. They know that Mr. Hoover is worked nearly to death in bringing something like order out of the chaos of our traditional system of food distribution, and that he ought to be permitted at the earliest possible moment to dispose of this minor vexation. But Senator Reed insists upon hearing all manner of witnesses in whose testimony the public has no interest at all and pushing into the future Hoover's account of his stewardship. Is it because he hopes that the charges against the Food Administration, however baseless, will in time work their silent effect upon public opinion? For such pettifogging the country has no time just now. Doubtless Senator Reed has constituents who delight in every obstacle that can be placed in the way of Mr. Hoover, but it is intolerable that their private spite should be given right of way over the public interest.

FROM the reports of the Congressional inquiries into the services supplying our army, one characteristic of the bureaucratic mind is made to stand out clearly. The three essential elements in supplying a material need are technical quality, price, and time of delivery, and of these the bureaucratic mind grasps clearly the importance of the first two but troubles little about the third. One gun delivers its missile with a velocity of 2,200 feet per second; another, with a velocity of 2,600 feet. The latter is plainly the better gun, technically. But suppose that it takes six months to supply the low-powered gun, a year to supply the high powered one? Such a consideration the bureaucrat brushes aside. It will be better in the end to have the better gun, he declares. Suppose a shipbuilder offers a plan for accelerating construction, at a very material increase in cost. The bureaucrat will think long before he will accept it. The interests of the Treasury must be protected, he says. Sacrifice quality or economy to time? Why, we have an eternity of time. On the battle-front values are quite reversed. Any gun is good that will shoot now, not six months from now. Any ship is cheap that will bring reinforcements and munitions soon, not late. Bayonets tooled down to within one two-thousandth of the specification, to be had next year, are empty hopes as compared with any kind of bayonet that will do execution now. The discrepancy between the bureaucratic and military conception of the value of time may result in tragic conclusions for the nation. Might we not wisely send to the front, to learn what time means, every man who is to hold a position of responsibility in supplying or equipping our armies?

ABOUT the merits of the Lewis gun the average American citizen can know little. But he knows much about the merits of Colonel Lewis if he has read the reports of the hearing before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on December 22nd. One thing the senatorial investigators were trying to get light on was the motive that prompted Colonel Lewis to renounce in favor of the government his claims to royalty, not on contracts sought and therefore hypothetical assets, but on contracts actually awarded and under

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execution. Why should Colonel Lewis want to present to the government $2,500,000 that belonged to him by far clearer title of service than most sums paid out by the government belong to their claimants? Especially when the official representatives of the government had met his offers of gratuitous services with what looked like calculated scorn? "Well," said Colonel Lewis, "that is rather a difficult question to answer. I suppose it is a psychological affair." Pressed further by Senator McKellar's inquiry whether, having been an officer of the government, he did not feel that he ought to help the government, Colonel Lewis replied: "Absolutely. I got my education at government expense. I have been persecuted by the government, and I want to pay it back in good money—give good money in return for it. But there is a far deeper question. I have only two sons. Both of them are at the front. They are with General Pershing. I may see them again and I may not. I am a father as you men here are fathers. You will see your sons go over before this trouble is over. We are not fighting the battle of the Allies: we are fighting the battle of the United States." This explains sufficiently why Colonel Lewis is not seeking profit, and it explains besides why it is hard to find limits to one's admiration for Colonel Lewis as a man and a soldier.

THE prohibition of liquor has a speculative psychological aspect. Those who favor the measure on moral grounds are generally satisfied that there is no good reason why men should drink. They are convinced that if a nation could just "forget" alcohol the whole problem would be conveniently solved. Acceptable as this conclusion may be in an emergency, a number of social psychologists are by no means content to quit the subject at that point. If men stop taking alcohol, what will they do instead? We hope, say their prayers. But if men do not rest at saying their prayers, what then? China got rid of the opium habit by creating the cigarette habit, and the number of cheap cigarettes now consumed in China exceeds the wildest estimates. The ingenuity which man has always exercised in finding and employing sedatives and stimulants implies that prohibition involves much more than physiology. To be effective, prohibition demands at least a new state of mind, and before that is achieved men may embark on experiments that will make alcohol seem as innocent as milk. It would not be at all strange if some enterprising psychist tried to prove that the Bolsheviki were being indulged by Russia as a mere substitute for vodka. By the same token, no doubt, the keystone of German Kultur is beer.

Saving Russia

IN Lloyd George's speech on war aims of last week there was one passage to which insufficient attention has been paid. In speaking of the demand which the Allies will make for the "complete restoration of national territory conquered by Germany" he added: "Since Russia has entered into separate negotiations, she, of course, must alone be responsible for the terms in respect to her own territories." A policy with respect to Russia is indicated in this passage, which if it is followed by the Allies would taint the treaty of peace with injustice and instability, and which as long as its effects endured would act as a barrier to the formation of a League of Nations. It is the policy of washing their hands of Russia and practically of delivering notice to the German government that so far as the Allies are concerned the principles which they propose to apply to the other territorial questions can be ignored on the Russian front. Russia, that is, will be turned over to Germany, and will have to submit to any terms which the German government may think it expedient to impose. The Russian nation, consequently, would have to choose between the alternatives of becoming the friend, the ally and the accomplice of Germany, or her irreconcilable enemy. In either event a grave and lasting source of insecurity would be introduced into the international situation.

Technically, the Allies are, of course, fully justified in paying Russia for deserting the common cause by abandoning the Russian nation to Germany. But this is not either the moment or the occasion for an exhibition even of just resentment or for following a course of behavior, which may be morally justifiable under the old rules, but which may have such disastrous consequences. All the Allied enemies of Germany wish to win the war as victory has been defined by President Wilson. Yet, no matter how much the war is won in other respects, the Allies would forfeit the fruits of victory in case they forced Russia to choose between becoming the special friend or the special enemy of Germany. There can be little doubt how Germany would act under the circumstances. She would seek compensation in Russia for any losses in Africa or the western front or in Middle Europe.

There is no sufficient reason for such a counsel of despair. There is still a chance of ultimately saving Russia and keeping her as a part of the anti-German alliance. The statesmen of the Allies can commit no graver blunder than to assume that Russia is irredeemably lost. Their failure to understand the New Russia has hitherto been the chief cause of the present crisis. But there is no longer any excuse for misunderstand-

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ing. Russia today is speaking plainly enough. And still the Allies apparently persist in laboring under the illusion that Lenine and Trotzky are dictating Russia's policies. It is high time for the world to know that there are not and cannot be any dictators in revolutionary Russia. Lenine and Trotzky are but the temporary spokesmen of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers. And there is a power in Russia greater even than this omnipotent Council. This is the Constituent Assembly.

No peace will be concluded by the revolutionary Russia unless ratified by the Constituent Assembly. This body will meet within a few days. The Allies must recognize it as Russia's supreme authority. The Constituent Assembly has been elected on the most democratic basis possible, including universal suffrage and proportional representation. Although the Bolsheviki form only one-third of its membership, the pacifist parties will dominate it. Even so it is sure to prove much less radical than the Council of Workmen and Soldiers, for its largest single party is the Social Revolutionary, which represents the peasant masses. If the Allies are fully alive to the opportunities which the internal situation in Russia still offers to them, Russia may yet be turned into a very effective opponent of Prussianism.

There are certainties even in the present condition of Russian affairs. One of these is the inviolability of the Constituent Assembly. The Lenine-Trotzky group attempted to violate its prerogative, advocating the supremacy of the Workmen's Council. The attempt immediately provoked a split in the ranks of the Bolsheviki. A large section of them insisted that the authority of the Constituent Assembly was sacred. The Congress of Peasants' Deputies which first supported the Bolshevik government, turned against it. The Ukraine threatened civil war against the Petrograd rulers. General Kaledine, the Cossack chief, feeling the rising tide of anti-Bolsheviki sentiment among the revolutionary elements, repudiated his counter-revolutionary designs and retired to make way for a new popular government.

The Bolshevik rule was in danger of being wrecked on this domestic issue. Let there be no mistake about this. The Bolsheviki, and other ruling elements, would be doomed in case of any attempt on their part to violate the Constituent Assembly. What saved Lenine and Trotzky was their energetic peace policy. This is the sole secret of their strength. The Russians yearn for peace, although loath to desert the Allies. But Trotzky knew how to steer a middle course, how to bring Russia nearer to peace and simultaneously to place on the Allies apparent responsibility for his indefensible policy. The Allies played into his hands.

On November 20th Trotzky, who is Commissary for Foreign Affairs, sent an ultimatum to the Allies, asking them to revise their war aims, with the warning that if no reply was received by November 23rd Russia would begin armistice negotiations. The Allies did not reply. Russia then made the proposal to all the belligerents for a general armistice and proceeded to negotiate one with the Central Powers. On December 5th the negotiations were suspended and seven days given to the Allies to state their war aims in case they refused to participate in the armistice. The Allies made no answer. On December 12th the negotiations with the Germans were resumed and an armistice concluded. Trotzky then issued a third ultimatum, stating that Russia would allow the Allies two months before consummating peace with the Central Powers. The Allies have so far shown no signs of life with regard to Russia.

Now the result of this Allied policy towards the Bolshevik government has been bad in three ways. It has kept the Bolsheviki in power at a moment when an acute internal issue arose which might otherwise have caused their collapse. It has enabled Trotzky to accuse the Allies to the Russian masses with ignoring and flouting Russia and with refusing even to explain their position. Finally, it has aroused in Russia a feeling of resentment towards the Allies, which no matter how unjustified is extremely human. The Russians have been doing their utmost to acquaint the world with their needs and purposes. Their wireless station has been kept busy during the past seven weeks flashing daily reports to all corners of the globe of what is going on in Russia. But only a small fraction of these reports ever reach the press. Instead a stream of conflicting fragmentary reports, most of which are utterly unfounded rumors, hinder public opinion in the Allied countries from seeing anything in the Russian situation but a mixture of treachery and anarchy. The Russians feel that they are being cut off from all means of communication with the people of the other countries, that no attempt is being made to understand their predicament, and that in spite of all the blood they have shed in the common cause, the Allied governments will not show them the ordinary courtesy of answering their communications.

This way of dealing with Russia ignores the spirit of the President's message. He spoke of "the voices of humanity that are in the air," which find expression in the Russian peace formula, and which embody "the instinctive judgment as to the right of plain men everywhere." But when these voices are actually raised they are refused a hearing. When they repeatedly ask for some official statement revising the war aims of the Allies, they

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are not even vouchsafed an answer explaining why the request is refused. Finally they are threatened by the British Prime Minister with being deprived of any benefit which they would obtain by the application to the Russian front of the principles for which the Allies are fighting elsewhere. Surely this will prove to be a disastrous diplomacy. Every reason which impels a democratic nation to fight against an autocratic Germany impels it also to fight for the friendship of a republican Russia. In order to keep that friendship it is not necessary to join with the Bolsheviki in seeking peace with Germany. It is only necessary to consider the sensibilities of a suffering and overwrought people and to explain to them in a formal proclamation what the war aims of the Allies are, and why they cannot discuss peace either on the Russian formula or on any basis suggested by Germany. By so doing they would strengthen the party in Russia favorable to their own cause and policy and check the steady increase of German influence. Instead of literally presenting Russia to Germany they would be placing obstacles in the way of a German triumph, which, even if they did not prevent immediate peace negotiations, would build up in Russia the foundations for an ultimate pro-Ally recovery.

The Germans and Their Government

NO phase of President Wilson's assault on the German military system is more peculiarly his own contribution to the propaganda of the war and is more necessary to the success of American policy than his reiterated distinction between the German government and the German people. Yet there is none which has been received with less understanding of its significance and purpose and with less appreciation of its peculiar serviceability both as an instrument of victory in the war and as a guaranty of security for the coming peace. The majority of American, French and English newspapers and publicists in their war polemics ignore the distinction both in letter and in spirit and visit on the Germans as a people the same condemnation which the President has reserved for their rulers. Powerful journals such as the London Times frankly parade their scepticism as to its truth or value and their opposition or indifference to the war diplomacy which President Wilson has based on it. Powerful political leaders such as ex-President Roosevelt share this scepticism and emphasize this opposition. Hence, although the distinction is implicit in Lloyd George's proffer of better terms to a democratic than to an autocratic Germany and in Mr. Balfour's proposal to render Germany either powerless or free, the disposition on the part of so many influential agencies of opinion in the Allied countries to misunderstand, ignore or oppose it has very much impaired Mr. Wilson's success in using it in his war diplomacy.

Opposition to the distinction has recently been stated by high European authority in the following language: "The attitude of the leaders of the German empire will change according to the depletion of resources and indispensable raw materials and the extent of the food supply. The question of a more or less democratic form of the constitution is secondary. One cannot be too much on guard against the manoeuvres which will give to Germany a democratic appearance in order the better to save her place in the world and to settle to the best advantage. A unified Germany under a new and more democratic form of government would be as imperialistic and as possessed with the idea of Germany hegemony as under William II. It is not true that the German people are innocent of the crimes of their rulers. Their final strategy to deceive the Allies and obtain a status quo ante peace with complete amnesty may be the Emperor's abdication." There is a measure of truth in this criticism which any statesman would be foolhardy to ignore, and to which President Wilson has assuredly allowed due weight. But it is based none the less upon a misunderstanding of the nature of the distinction and a lack of sympathy with its underlying political purpose. Let us trace this misunderstanding and lack of sympathy to its source.

In distinguishing between the German people and their government, Mr. Wilson manifestly is not calling attention to an actual fact. The Germans have loyally supported their government since the beginning of the war. They cannot be exonerated from conniving at the misdeeds of their rulers, and in so far as they can be made to suffer during the war for their connivance they, unlike the suffering population of the Allied countries, are getting no more than their deserts. All this is sufficiently obvious, but it is not conclusive as a criticism of Mr. Wilson's policy. He is not pretending to recognize an already existing separation. He is aiming to achieve a separation which can be made effective in the future, and which in so far as it is effective will form the one perfect fruit of victory by the Allies in the war. He is trying to furnish to his countrymen a reason which will justify them in continuing to fight against an aggressive and malevolent Germany, but which even in the bitterness of conflict will prepare the way for the future admission of a different Germany into a society of nations.

The degree of complicity in the misdeeds of

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their rulers of which the German people can be fairly accused does not invalidate such a constructive distinction. Their responsibility differs in kind and in amount from the responsibility which can be properly fastened on their government. The German people have no legal control over the German national army, navy and foreign policy. They had not accepted this disfranchisement without protest. Ever since the formation of the empire a large minority of the electorate had been agitating with increasing success to obtain such control. The steady growth of the Socialist minority undoubtedly predisposed the ruling class to save its traditional domination by gambling, while there was yet time, on the chances of war. Its ability to adopt such an abominable course depended upon the irresponsibility of the government with respect to the German nation. It could work in secret. It could use its overlordship at home as leverage to secure overlordship in Europe. It was not obliged to be as frank with its own people as a government would have been which rested on popular or parliamentary consent. It could demand from the German nation on the pretext of national defense an amount and an efficiency of armament which under its manipulation was capable of becoming a serious threat to the security of the neighbors of Germany, and which, as the violation of Belgium proved, was planned and worked out in detail as a means to secure a preponderant position in the world. Better than any other government of a great European nation except Russia, the German rulers were enabled by the forms of the constitution to conceal behind patriotic professions sinister ambitions fatal to the peace and security of Europe.

President Wilson is consequently going to the root of the matter in asking the German people to assume a larger measure of control over the army, the navy and the foreign policy of Germany. The question of a more or less democratic form of the constitution is primary, and not, as Mr. Wilson's critic declares, secondary. If the ruling class can be made to yield control over the German army, navy and foreign policy, the foundation of the whole plan of European domination will be knocked from under. An autocracy which cannot carry things with a high hand at home cannot carry things with a high hand abroad. Its overthrow would be a clear indication of a new and better disposition on the part of the German people. It would be a clear evidence of an attempt in good faith on their part to give increasing security to Europe by winning increasing self-government for themselves.

There is of course no way of guaranteeing to France and Russia the future civility of a democratized Germany. If Frenchmen prefer to believe that a unified Germany under a new and more democratic form of government would continue to be "imperialistic," their misgiving cannot be disproved in advance of an actual test. But before yielding to such misgivings they would do well to realize how serious and costly are its implications. It would lead either to the ultimate extermination of Germany or the permanent military organization of the world. Are we willing to believe that owing to some depravity inherent to German human nature it would pervert democratic institutions and use them as a screen for a conspiracy, planned and shared by a substantial majority of the German people, against the peace and security of the world? Are we willing to believe that democracy in Germany would not work as it has worked elsewhere, and provide safeguards against an imperialistic policy in Europe.

Few Americans certainly will yield willingly to such beliefs. Democracy, as they well know, cannot get away from the mania for publicity, and publicity would be fatal to an imperialist conspiracy to obtain the hegemony of Europe. No nation could allow its imperialist designs to see the light of day without creating obstacles to their realization; and if they did not see the light of day in a democracy, it would be no more than an autocracy in disguise. A German parliament which controlled the army and navy and foreign policy would like all parliaments be compelled to explain the reasons of military preparation and consequently either to adjust expenditures to a frank policy of defense or else to give sufficient warning to the world of what it was trying to do. The conspiracy, if there were one, could be detected and could not be acted on without being shared with too many people.

Democratic institutions have not, to be sure, proved to be a perfect safeguard against imperialism in foreign policy. Neither has the ostensible popular or parliamentary control of foreign policy always resulted in its clarification for the benefit of the public and the sympathetic adjustment of the national armament to it. Englishmen did not know previous to August, 1914, just what the military responsibilities of the country on the continent were and how much of an army was needed to redeem them. But if the government of a democracy does possess imperialist designs it must at least be frank about them; and no government can be frank about a policy of world domination. In the past democratic and parliamentary governments brought with them enough respect for the rights of other nations and enough publicity about national policies to prevent such governments from cherishing and planning to carry out a kind of

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imperialism which went so far as to threaten the balance of power in Europe, and in the future after the experience of the present war, people and parliaments will be much more alert and anxious than formerly to know what the foreign policy of their country is and to prevent it from becoming offensive.

There would still remain the danger, suggested by the President's critic, of the hypocritical assumption by Germany of democratic inoffensiveness merely as a manoeuvre to escape from her existing predicament. We cannot take this danger very seriously. There is a sincere and powerful movement in Germany on behalf of an effective parliamentary control over foreign policy and its instruments. If the Reichstag once obtained such control, it would not surrender its new powers except as the result of a coup d'état and probably of civil war. But what if this suspicion should be justified? What if Germany should merely pretend democracy and should prove, after a moderate settlement, to be as dangerous as ever to the peace of Europe? President Wilson's program provides a final safeguard against such a contingency. The anti-German alliance could then put into effect the threat, feared more than any other by the German nation, of refusing to admit Germany "to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace." In this as in other respects the most effective protection against the indefinite endurance of a dangerous and malevolent Germany consists not only in resisting and if necessary in punishing any indication of a stiff-necked and unrepentant offensiveness, but also in conveying to the German people a sense of how much they will gain by placing their government under popular control and by qualifying for admission into the partnership of nations.

It is precisely by offering to the German people a real contrast between what will happen to them if they behave well and what will happen to them if they continue to behave badly, that President Wilson hopes to create a distinction, which now has only an incipient existence, between the German people and their government. The ordinary militarist and the ordinary pacifist would not offer to the Germans any such alternative. The former would crush and punish them for their past misdeeds and seek future security by depriving them so far as possible of the power to repeat the offense. The latter would acquiesce in the triumph of the German ruling class in Germany and in the world, because he is unwilling to employ force to resist force or because he fears the growth of militarism at home in America more than he fears it in Germany. But President Wilson alleviates present fears with future hopes. He realizes the inevitable growth of American militarism as a consequence of victory for German militarism. He realizes that while German militarism would wax more offensive as a consequence of victory and needs to be defeated, it will not and cannot be wiped out merely as a consequence of defeat. He is fighting against a state of mind and he seeks to subdue it by a combination of coercion and conciliation. If the defeat of German oppression is to be final, every possible attempt must be made to persuade the German people eventually to acquiesce in it. That is why even in the midst of a war, sustained so far by the willing sacrifices of the German people, he insists upon a distinction between the German people and their government. By means of that distinction he offers to them and to the democracies of the world a way out, which, while it makes the utmost use of military and economic coercion, does not rest exclusively upon military victory, but calls to the aid of military force the political principle of mutual accommodation.

Conditional Economic War

WHAT distinguishes the statesmanship of President Wilson from that of the other leaders of the Allied cause is not a more pacific tendency, not a greater reluctance to use drastic means of attaining the ultimate objects of war making. The distinguishing characteristic of President Wilson's statesmanship is nothing but superior rationality. The President desires a stable peace, but not more ardently than other Allied statesmen. He desires to attain this end at the least cost to the world; so also do the other statesmen. But the President can always be counted upon to hold the objects of fighting clearly in view and to scrutinize carefully the means to be employed for their attainment. More than any other statesman, he recognizes the potency of political forces as instruments for the accomplishment of international designs and understands how to use them. It will be difficult for the historian of the future to account for the fact that America, after a century of isolation and amateur diplomacy, should have produced the one statesman capable of handling with skill the delicate moral factors involved in effective war policy.

The contrast between President Wilson's methods and those of his European confrères is strikingly illustrated by the different employments that have been made of the project of economic war upon Germany after the peace. In the Paris Economic Conference our European Allies defi-

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nitely declared economic war, at least for the period of reconstruction, upon Germany. In his last message President Wilson declared what an English statesman has described as conditional economic war. It is intimated in the President's message that we may refuse to enter upon commercial arrangements with an unregenerate Germany. Absolute economic war versus conditional economic war: what are their respective merits from the point of view of international morale?

There is no longer any doubt as to the effect of the threat of absolute economic war. The Paris Conference announced to Germany that if the war ended in Allied victory, Germany would find herself handicapped in every way in her overseas trade. A long list of the important raw materials of industry are practically controlled by the nations allied against Germany. These materials were to be denied to German industry. Successful navigation, except for the short North Atlantic voyage, depends upon access to stores of bunker coal, controlled by the Allies. These were to be withheld from the Germans. Before the war Germany depended largely upon British banks to finance her trading operations. This privilege, an extremely important one, would doubtless have been withheld. Together with the inevitable restriction upon German export to Allied territory, these measures against Germany represented a serious menace to her permanent economic welfare. They were described in Germany as a policy of economic strangulation, and the phrase was hardly too vigorous. All Germany, at the time, had been taught by grinding experience that without participation in world trade a modern nation can live but miserably. The most bitter poverty lay in defeat. Only by victory could Germany hope to escape the economic toils her adversaries were preparing for her.

Now that we begin to understand the part played in war by moral factors, we are at a loss to account for the fact that the Allies ever permitted the resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference to be made public. What did they expect to gain by announcing to Germany that only through sweeping victories could she hope to escape present humiliation and future economic strangulation as well? Does a general investing a stronghold send a herald to announce that every soul in it shall perish by the sword? Were the facts not so well authenticated, one might incline to the hypothesis that the Paris Economic Conference was an invention of the German General Staff. At all events, it was an invention worth many batteries of "Busy Bertas" to the German military autocracy.

The Paris Economic Conference has receded into history. Its mischief ended with President Wilson's denunciation of selfish economic leagues. And therewith the way was cleared for the President's application of the threat of economic war. Unless Germany effects a reorganization of her government that will take her out of the category of predatory imperialism, we shall refuse to have dealings with her. The shipowners, manufacturers and industrial workers, who, under the menace of the Paris Conference, had no hope for satisfactory living conditions except in the prowess of German militarism, are now given warning that what stands between them and satisfactory living conditions is precisely German militarism.

Is the threat an empty one? Would the nations, once peace is restored, forego the benefits of trade with Germany, however militaristic her government may remain? They will, unless they are utterly devoid of capacity to learn by experience. The German government has fostered industry, not primarily, as we now know, as a means of advancing the general welfare, but as a means of providing wealth and industrial power to support militaristic designs. The German government encouraged trade, not as a nation of honest traders would, as a means of increasing general prosperity, but as a means of "peaceful penetration." The German house abroad traded in "influence" as well as in cheap goods; the German commercial agents served incidentally as spies and plotters. The peaceful nations of the world will deserve the fate prepared against them if they do not compel a divorce between German trade and imperialistic scheming. And the sooner it is made clear to the German people that there can be no world trade after the war with a nation that is the sport of a military autocracy, the nearer will be the conclusion of an enduring peace.

There are, to be sure, German generals, Junkers, professors of "national economy," who assert that economic war on Germany will be futile. Has not Germany proved self-sufficing in the years of war? And after the war, unless she is crushed, will she not still enjoy favorable trade relations with Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and probably Russia? These were poor countries before the war; they will be much poorer after it. To organize them for such effective production that their trade would be a fair offset to the loss of access to the sea-bound traffic of the world is a work not of years but of decades. The German people have shown themselves capable of enduring all things when they conceived their national existence to be at stake. This does not prove that for the sake of retaining an oppressively autocratic government, they will be content indefinitely to shiver in the rags of their own self-sufficiency.

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America's Need for Haste

IN one point all loyal Americans must agree: Every moment of needless delay in bringing the whole force of the United States to bear against the military power of Germany is a menace to the interests of the whole world. If the United States arrives a month later than the earliest possible day, our cause has in effect lost a great battle. If our coming is retarded by a year, we may well have lost the war and the world its liberties. A great French general has warned us of the necessity of our putting in an appearance while there are still Frenchmen and Englishmen to fight beside us. Let us not delude ourselves by vainglorious estimates of our own national strength. We are powerful, but we shall win the war only if we are ready to fight while our Allies are still powerful.

We disagree among ourselves sharply, often violently, as to the methods by which the final objective of the war can be attained. At the one extreme are those who believe that the world will never rest easy until Germany is subjected to terms of peace that will exclude her from the category of great Powers. At the other extreme are those who would content themselves with the international status quo ante. One group of extremists believe that all Germany must be regarded as of a piece with the Hohenzollerns and the German General Staff; another group believe that the German people are as pacific as any other and are capable of wresting control from their war lords without international pressure. For our own part we have little patience with either extreme. The destruction of Germany as a great Power, if it were desirable, would still be a counsel of perfection. Private citizens who are not responsible for the cost may urge it, but they can not appeal to the support of a single statesman in the Allied group. Clémenceau, the most irreconcilable of them all, demands victory, only victory. We all demand victory. But there is a great gulf between victory and the annihilation of Germany or her reduction to the rôle of a second rate Power. This gulf can not be bridged by hope or by hate, but only by human lives. And the responsible statesmen of the Allies know that they cannot dispose of enough lives to bridge it.

If the destruction of Germany is a counsel of perfection, the restoration of the international status quo ante is a counsel of despair. The fruit of those antecedent international conditions was the present war. Their restoration would present ahead of us the spectre of a war even more hideous and disastrous. At whatever cost, we must make out of the war an instrument for the establishment of an international order that will be safe. And this involves far reaching changes both national and international. So long as the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs and the cliques of satellites surrounding them can rush nations into war, the peace of the world will be precarious. So long as it remains doubtful whether the disinterested nations will come to the relief of a state menaced with aggression, peace will be insecure even with national governments under democratic control. Both democracy and international organization are requisite to the security of mankind. This is our belief. And America can use the war as a means to its realization. This is our faith.

We have in the group of nations combined against Germany the nucleus of an international organization. But whether it shall ever be more than a nucleus depends upon the strength and devotion of America. Our accession to the ranks of the Allies heavily emphasized the international character of their cause. Before we declared war the Germans could assert that Russia was fighting for Constantinople, Italy for Trieste, France for Alsace-Lorraine, England for the German colonies. These were nationalistic aims, and the German government could build up a moral case out of them, plausible at home, however flimsy it appeared in the eyes of the world. That the Allies had other grounds for warmaking, that their nationalistic aims were merely incidental, was made sufficiently clear when the United States joined them. We want no territory, no indemnities, no commercial privileges. We want international justice and security, and in so far as we are powerful in the Allied councils, the common aim of our allies and ourselves is international. The German nationalistic purpose is in conflict, not with a group of other nationalistic purposes, however legitimate, but with a common international purpose.

In so far as the United States is strong, the Allied object in the war must be the establishment of an international order making impossible the recurrence of war. In so far as the United States is weak, the international object must give way to the nationalistic purposes of the several Allies. It is not merely that our Allies will think little of our ideals if they are not backed up by an equally ambitious performance. They can not afford to put their trust in an international organization unless we demonstrate in the present crisis that we are ready to bring decisive forces into the field in its defense. Unless we are to have a trustworthy international order, it is the plain business of each one of our European allies to seek safety in strategic frontiers and in the permanent disablement of the enemy. It is Italy's business to make the Adriatic an Italian lake, if she can, no matter what Slavic national aspirations might thereby be frustrated. It is the business of France to make

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the Rhine the national boundary, if she can, even though a Germany irredenta would be the result. Strategic boundaries do not insure peace, but nevertheless they handicap the enemy. They are better than nothing; and superior security is not to be had, unless America succeeds in proving herself powerful.

America has demanded a democratized Germany. By what right can we call upon the rulers of Germany to heed our demand? By no right, except the might we can apply. We know that there are democratic forces at work in Germany. We know that they encounter all but insuperable obstacles. Autocracy represents a minority interest, but an interest controlling the governmental machinery and the army. The rule of the autocrat will end only when formidable forces fighting for democracy appear over the horizon, in the van of still greater forces certain in the end to prove irresistible.

It is conceivable that our allies may win their national objects in the war, even if we prove too dilatory to be of material assistance to them. Germany is weary: she may become so weary before the end of another year that she will yield Alsace-Lorraine and compel Austria to yield the Trentino and Istria and even Bosnia Herzegovina. Our objects in the war, the demoralization of the Central Powers and the establishment of an international system of peace, can not be won through German weariness alone. They can be won only if we make haste. Our influence in the final settlement will be measured by the force we can apply, in time.

The Responsibility of Congress for Military Delay

AMERICAN politics have set the stage for many ironical performances but none more ironical than the spectacle of an investigation by Congressional committees of the reason for tardiness in the War Department's military preparations. It is precisely comparable to an exploration by Satan of the sources of sin. No matter what degree of responsibility may be fastened either on the general war administration or upon the bureau chiefs in the Department for failure to accelerate sufficiently the manufactures and delivery of supplies for the new American army, there can be no doubt where the ultimate responsibility lies for the apparent inability of the American nation to arm speedily and effectively. Congress itself always has been the insuperable obstacle to the making of those antecedent preparations during peace which are indispensable in the event of war to the quick and thorough concentration of the national military resources.

For years military experts in the War Department have warned Congress of the need of preparing more adequately for a smooth and quick transition from peace to war. They did not ask until recently for a large standing army, or for a huge accumulation of military stores. They did ask for a regular military establishment which was flexible and capable of being rapidly enlarged. They did ask Congress to provide in advance for the special machinery with which large amounts of munitions and supplies could quickly be obtained. The plan most frequently recommended in the reports of the General Staff was that of forming the small regular army into the skeleton of a much larger force, which would in part consist of trained reservists and in part of wholly untrained men, but with every antecedent preparation made for incorporating the first group into existing units and training and equipping the second without delay. The plan required in particular the addition to the regular army of a number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers disproportionate to its size, and in addition a large officers' reserve. It also demanded sufficient appropriations by the government for machine equipment to enable the War Department as soon as war was imminent to begin immediately the manufacture of guns and supplies on a large scale. But Congress never paid the slightest attention to these recommendations. It persisted in regarding the regular army not as an organization which should be ready to fight an actual war, but as a police force for service at home and in the insular dependencies. It was a rigid and lifeless body, intended to function inoffensively to local political interests during peace rather than dangerously to America's enemies in the event of war.

Congress has been either the father or the protector of every abuse or defect in the methods and organization of the War Department, which is preventing America in the present crisis from being an immediately dangerous enemy to Germany. It spent money on maintaining useless army posts, which should have been used for training reserve officers or for providing for a reserve of equipment, supplies and machine tools. Its military committees have always been partial to the continuation of the independent Bureau system in the Department, which is responsible for so much of the existing inefficiency. It consented very reluctantly to the constitution of a General Staff, and has worked to prevent it from becoming more than the eyes of the army—the eyes, not the brain, and not too closely connected with the brain. It has always allowed its political interest in the state

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national guard to stand in the way either of the efficient federalization of the militia or the substitution for them of a reserve army, subject to national authority, which could have been made quickly available either for domestic or foreign service. Prolonged and disheartening delays were the inevitable result of the way in which Congress, ever since the Spanish-American war exposed the defects in American military preparation, has deliberately treated the regular army. In order to complete the present revelations, there should be added to the investigation of the War Department by Congress an investigation of the record of Congress in military legislation by a select committee of American generals.

In proposing such a supplementary inquiry, The New Republic must not be understood as disparaging the value of the current hearings. They have already brought to light facts which the American public needed to know. They have already proved that even given the untoward conditions the War Department has not moved as quickly as it might in providing equipment for the new American army. They have already indicated the unwisdom of the discouragement by the military authorities of the publication of disagreeable facts, of which so many people were aware and which in the long run could not be concealed. They have already resulted in beneficial changes in organization and personnel. Nevertheless the inquiry will fail to enlighten American public opinion as to the ultimate cause of the tardy preparations unless it places the responsibility for the delay on Congress, and upon the past popular indifference to the American army, rather than on the War Department. Considering the nature of American military organization at the time of the American declaration of war against Germany, prolonged delays could have been avoided only by an exhibition of superhuman energy and organizing ability; and the supermen capable of saving some months in equipping an army could not be improvised any more than could the trained soldiers.

The American nation and Congress cannot adopt a policy of starving the army and of confining the work of its officers to a deadening routine of petty detail, and then expect the War Department, whenever a crisis occurs, to cast aside its pedantry and red tape and jump to the level of great captains of military organization. Congress has had delivered to it for war purposes the kind of military organization which it had deliberately ordered. The upper officials of the American army consist for the most part of patriotic men and capable soldiers who have done their best to keep the regular army alive, but who have been thwarted by public neglect and congressional opposition. They have never been allowed to organize a military machine which was capable of making war, and the machine has naturally broken down when war had to be made. The wonder is that they have succeeded in accomplishing so much as they have done.

The outbreak of war has converted the American army from a torpid into an enormously active and growing body. Its organization is trying to adjust itself to the size of its job. It is gradually doing so, but not as quickly as it should. It needs to be forced into even more radical changes in personnel and organization than those which have already been made. Congress is the best agency to exercise pressure, and it is of course the source from which any supplementary legislation which is needed must come. But in drawing this legislation Congress will fail unless it is guided by expert military opinion rather than by its traditional fear of an army which could not be allowed to be efficient because the price of efficiency was some independence of congressional control. Nothing but results count in war. The only justification for the investigation is the determination to secure improved results—that is to place more and better equipped and trained soldiers in France in a shorter time. The way in which Congress can best contribute to the results is to give the War Department what it demands in appropriations and legislation, to avoid interfering in the detail of the war administration, and then to serve notice that if the results are not forthcoming there will be trouble. It cannot in this way enable the country to escape from the penalty of its past mistakes in military policy, but it will at least be making an indispensable present contribution to American military success.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1917, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT, ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER.

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YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FOUR DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES TEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FOUR DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, FIVE DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE: REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER.

ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

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Retarding the Allies

OUR persistent refusal to organize ourselves into a unity of command for the purchasing of munitions of war is very bad for the armies of the Allies, just as it is very bad for our own army.

All next spring, all next summer, the Allies will shelter us. We have done our best, as individuals. Not one man out of a hundred at Washington among our chief administrators but has given his work-time, his play-time, his sleep-time, his last of thought, his last of health, at demand, to any duty for this war. I have seen men come to Washington heavy with the personal ambitions of private life and I have seen them rise released to a selflessness, to a willingness to be subordinated, to be sacrificed, which makes them worthy, almost, to be where they are—standing behind our soldiers. They have labored, these men, these officials, old and new, usually with excellent minds, often with minds of positively splendid power, to their utmost. Nevertheless let us look at our case as clearly as the Germans look at it.

The Germans know that not for a moment in any month of next year shall we be able to be as much as ten per cent of the genuine fully-trained, fully-equipped, fighting-line effectiveness thrown up against them on the frontier of democratic civilization between the Adriatic and the English Channel. Not ten per cent of it, in the immediate military sense. The Germans know this. We really know it. Let us really admit it, and act on it.

We must make every effort to get supplies into the hands of the Allied armies as smoothly, as steadily, as flowingly, as possible. We shall not starve our own army, or even in any slightest way stint it. We cannot train enough men in two years to consume our industrial resources. We have a surplus. It is for us to see that the Allies get that surplus with the minimum of daily delay and with the maximum of daily rapidity. We must do it, and we want to do it.

But we cannot do it, we cannot conceivably do it, with our present organization. The minimum of delay, the maximum of rapidity, every twenty-four hours, means unity. And our present organization is an outrage against unity.

For look at it. In our War Department we have those well known separate purchasing divisions (Quartermaster, Ordnance, and so on) which, being separate, have to be "coördinated." Nobody at Washington denies the need of getting up early in the morning and "coördinating" all day long. George Porter, head of the Section on Coöperation with States in the Council of National Defense, has offered a reward to anybody who can think up a word that will mean "coördinate" and that yet will not bore everybody sick. The first thing that "coördinates" the purchasing divisions in the War Department is the General Staff.

Well, the General Staff is indeed a "coördinating" body. It must "coördinate" the War Department for military purposes. The General Staff is a vital thing, an indispensable thing, in the matter of "coördinating" the War Department for military purposes, for fighting. But what sort of thing is it in the matter of "coördinating" the War Department for purchasing purposes, for industrial purposes, for purposes having to do with factories and the control of factories and the control of the capital and of the labor in factories? Who are on the General Staff? Soldiers. Soldiers taken from the "line." Rightly. They are to be the army's military brain. They have come from army-posts. They have studied troops. That is what they know. That is what they are for. Their knowledge of industry, their knowledge of the feelings of the people in industry, is, for the most part, nil.

One of our most famous generals opened an official conference last year on the subject of Labor on American Railways by remarking, most interestingly: "I am against trade-unions." It was really too bad that John Ruskin could not have materialized out of his grave at that moment to say: "And I wish to remind you that I am against all locomotives, steam, electric, internal-combustion, and other." One of the best ways to try to get a Bolshevik revolution in this country would be to allow our generals to become important in the control of industry. And the purchasing of munitions, in the end, here as in Britain and as in France, is nothing less than the control of industry, of all basic industry.

Therefore the General Staff, as constituted, being a military brain and not an industrial brain, is incapable of really "coördinating" and accelerating the War Department's purchasing divisions; and therefore, for this reason, as well as for other reasons, we now have a new "coördinating" body within the War Department—the "War Council"—consisting of certain bureau-chiefs and ex-bureau-chiefs among whom there are men, like General Sharpe and General Crozier, who have had recent purchasing experience.

It is too soon to be sure just what this new "War Council" can do. One thing, though, may

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be said about it safely. Part of its purpose is to take certain people and "kick them up politely to the Lords." The difference is that when you kick Sir Edward Grey up into being Lord Grey, you are through with him. We are not through with General Sharpe. Under General Sharpe, acting as Quartermaster General, many of our soldiers shivered and died in thin khaki. General Sharpe's purchasing division did not succeed in giving them woolens. For such failures General Sharpe is held responsible, rightly or wrongly, within the War Department as well as outside it; and he is removed from acting as Quartermaster General; and General Goethals is asked to act as Quartermaster General; but General Sharpe is asked to sit among the five men who are to "coördinate" General Goethals. What are General Sharpe's chances, what are General Crozier's chances at "coördinating" General Goethals? Just about what Mr. Denman's were.

There is only one sort of "coördinating" body worth while in the internal organization of Washington. This sort of "coördinating" body must have two characteristics. It must consist of the top man, the strongest men, in its field; and it must have the power not merely to nag but to order, to compel, outright and forthwith. There is no such "coördinating" body in all Washington. That is why the word "coördinate" is now a stench in the nostrils of the town.

But we are not yet finished with "coördinating" our purchasing divisions. We now come to the War Industries Board. And we come to the Purchasing Commission within the War Industries Board. Let us follow the Allies to this Purchasing Commission, from which they get their permits for purchases in this country.

They wish to buy, let us say, an important finished product. In the matter of the raw material out of which that product is to be made, they see Mr. Baruch. In the matter of the product itself they see Mr. Brookings. Now Mr. Brookings is a very fine person, of high intelligence; but, by virtually universal consent, he lacks the one thing a man in his present position must especially and conspicuously have. He lacks speed. He is slow at decisions. People in the War Department complain that they send things over to him and he keeps them, and then keeps them some more, and then may return them with the observation that he has nothing to suggest. He is a desirable man for some place in the government. But it is not given even to desirable men that they should have all desirable qualities fitting them for all places. Flatly, by consent of virtually all persons who deal with him, Mr. Brookings does not fit the Purchasing Commission; because our purchases must be made with speed and Mr. Brookings happens to be quite without speed.

But what can be done about it? Observe! The Purchasing Commission has no head. It consists of Mr. Baruch, Mr. Brookings and Judge Lovett. They are equals. No one of them can dismiss either of the others.

So we must go higher. The Purchasing Commission is part of the War Industries Board, and Mr. Willard is chairman of the War Industries Board. Perhaps he could make a change? Not at all. He is merely the "chairman" of a "board." Mr. Brookings is not his subordinate. He is really his colleague.

So we must go higher still. The War Industries Board reports to the Council of National Defense. Perhaps the six cabinet members who constitute the Council could make a change? Perhaps. But only very perhaps. Mr. Brookings was appointed by the President himself. And what does that mean?

It means that under Mr. Baker, who is chairman of the Council of National Defense, and under Mr. Willard, who is chairman of the War Industries Board, and within the Purchasing Commission, three layers from the top, we have a presidential appointee, whom nobody will or can pick out and transplant until the President himself looks and learns and is informed and speaks.

Is this good organization? Is this the way to lighten the burdens of the President? Is this unity? Unity requires that every field of general action, such as ships, such as munitions, such as food, shall have a single head, with power to control all other men in that field. We have this single head in food. We begin to have something like it in ships. We have nothing like it in munitions.

For let us proceed in company with the Allies. Mr. Brookings is about to decide whether or not to allow the Allies to use certain of our factories. But he must first find out whether or not our War Department wants those factories. He must consult, for instance, our Chief of Ordnance. Our Chief of Ordnance may arrive at a certain view. Mr. Brookings may arrive at a certain other view, or may remain in doubt. Then we may have a meeting of the whole War Industries Board.

But the War Industries Board, even as a whole, has no real right to coerce its own internal Purchasing Commission; and it most certainly has no real right to coerce the Chief of Ordnance. Therefore the decision, in important disputed cases, lags. In one such case it has been lagging now for several weeks. Everybody concerned has known all the facts. Nobody concerned has been

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able to say "Absolutely, Yes" or "Absolutely, No."

But we proceed again. The decision has been reached. The Purchasing Commission has authorized a purchase for the Allies. And Judge Lovett, as the head of "priority" within the Purchasing Commission, gives that purchase a "priority order." Simultaneously the purchasing divisions in the War Department are issuing thousands of "priority orders" on purchases for us, purchases important, purchases unimportant. All these purchases, the important ones and the unimportant ones together, start from their factories and rush toward their destinations on equal terms. Sawdust to be used in the packing of ice for our army in France may have just as good a chance of getting to the seaboard as the material for explosives for the Allied guns. And we will find space on our ships for all sorts of strange shipments, remotely useful, when things of instant use for the French Army are lying on the docks.

Why? Because we persistently refuse to unify. We prefer to "coördinate."

Have we not had about enough of it? It makes our ablest men look like fools. Perhaps Mr. Brookings is not so indecisive as people in the War Department think he is. He is working in the midst of an indecisive system. If he were working within a unified system, he might turn out to be a perfectly effective man. For unity brings responsibility, and it brings urgency, and it brings the necessity for action.

Imagine all these purchases that we have mentioned, and all these priorities, massed under one man. The War Industries Board is his General Staff, an industrial General Staff, an industrial brain. It is the beginnings of it. The present purchasing divisions in the Army Department become subordinate, bodily, directly, to this one man. Their present chiefs become his assistants. He is our Head of War Supplies. He is not the head of a fragment, the submerged head of a dislocated fragment, of our War Supplies. He stands out. He may report to the President; or he may, as some people suggest, report to Mr. Baker. In either case, he will be the Organizer and Controller of American War Industry; and there will fall on him the same glare of public interest and of public demand that now falls on Mr. Hoover and on Mr. Hurley. If Mr. Brookings then is found to be slow, this man, for self-preservation, will let him out, just exactly as Mr. Hurley has let out Admiral Capps and Admiral Harris. But now?

Who now is responsible for Mr. Brookings? The President. The Chairman of the Council of National Defense. The five other members of the Council of National Defense. The chairman of the War Industries Board. Totaling, in practice, nobody.

So we get slowed. And so the Allies get slowed. And the War Industries Board goes on "coördinating" the War Department with a chairman who has no real right even to "coördinate" the Board. And the General Staff of the Army goes on "coördinating" the purchasing divisions of the War Department with a brain belonging to the army-post and the field of battle. And the new "War Council" will begin to "coördinate" a new lot of bureau-chiefs, chosen for reputed strength, with the help of a complement of ex-bureau-chiefs, discarded for reputed weakness. And Mr. Baker and Mr. Wilson, in the midst of this cloud of petty executives and palavering "coördinators," disappear to Olympus. And we get some speed. We get much speed. But we do not get top speed. We do not get anything like top speed. And just over the horizon is the portal to which every Ally, in its turn, has come, the portal bearing the famous words Lloyd George has repeated to us, words which, if they flash out there when we arrive, are the death warrant to our form of democrat-government in this world: "Too Late." Too Feeble and Too Late. The future will then be either to Hohenzollerns or to Bolsheviki. Constitutional, irresolute democracy will have come to its end.

WILLIAM HARD.

America Meets France

THE other day I met an American naval lieutenant in a Paris tram, enquiring of the puzzled woman conductor the way to Notre Dame. As we went over the Pont-Neuf together we paused to look at the curving Seine with its noble chain of bridges, and the gray-blue pile of the Louvre against the misty October sky.

"Paris is a beautiful city all right," he said earnestly, "but I don't think much of the people."

"What's the matter with them?"

Well, he had been cheated by cabdrivers and had been refused admittance to the Opéra and the Louvre. When I remarked that the monuments were closed to visitors because of the scarcity of labor, he insisted:

"But I told them I was an *American!* Usually if you say that you get anything you want."

American stock in France began at the top of the market, and we have received so many special privileges and so much spontaneous gratitude that we are only just waking up to the fact that we must take our place among all the other hordes of

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foreigners, friendly and inimical, who have invaded the soil of France in the last three and a half years. I was waiting in the sad little room where permits are given out for the *Zone des Armées* when a boy in khaki strode in demanding immediate attention. The sergeant, after asking his business, offered him a wooden chair and a dirty number like the rest of us; the French widow of twenty, who wanted to visit her husband's grave; the broken old farmer, who had to study the remains of his beet sugar refinery; the Red Cross engineer who must reach the village he was rebuilding; the French Captain, who had a sick mother near Compiègne.

"But it's 4:30 and if I'm not at the Préfecture by 5:00 I can't get off tomorrow!"—and to the sergeant's irritating smile:

"Look here, don't you know we come over here to *help* you? And this is the way you treat us."

The difference between France in the abstract—the France with which we have been in intimate spiritual communion since 1914—and France in the concrete begins to make itself felt on any Bordeaux liner before she has cleared New York harbor. We had, for instance, as descendants of Lafayette and Rochambeau, a much be-medalled aviator, a solemn munitions expert, a flip journalist, an elderly professor, and several nondescript commercial gentlemen. The aviator at once presented his heart to the only American girl who looked—and behaved—as if she had been brought up on the Grands Boulevards; otherwise a gulf yawned between the nations. It was interesting to watch the French faces as they passed the busy corners of the deck where the forty-five Y. M. C. A. secretaries were established, acquiring "French in Two Hundred Words," where the seventeen lady cantineers with Red Crosses on their hats were discussing recipes for the poilu's soup; where the fifty Quakers were going through gymnastics so as to be ready to build portable houses and drive ploughs through mud and barbed wire; where the nurses' aides and the ambulance boys, the teachers of the blind and the tuberculosis and child specialists foregathered, with the salvation or the amelioration of the French race in view. The professor, who had been profoundly moved by the personal experience of the American sentiment for France, confessed to me one day that he nevertheless feared for his country's reputation the exaltation of these three hundred and fifty strenuous idealists. Would they not expect to see on the shores of France some romantic symbol of change and glory—something like the flags of Fifth Avenue, for instance.

"You still imagine war to be a noble adventure," he said, "and for you it is still abnormal. We went into it at the beginning with clenched teeth, and we have endured it increasingly as a family endures a terrible illness; and now it has become so normal that it will deceive you."

Undoubtedly the first shock of France at war does come to our enthusiasm as a cold douche, and it takes the average American perhaps a week to re-act from his sacrificial state of mind. By way of "reception committee" he is met by the French petty official who greets him much as the American immigration official greets the arriving Serbian, or Italian; the French women of the trains and stations, thoroughly weary of doing "man's work"; the canny French tradesman who—having seen the first American soldiers throw gold out of their car windows in return for Camembert cheeses, seeing the present ones ready to pay double for everything, provided they get "the best"—tries to cheat him out of his eye-teeth. Then Paris, which he had expected to find empty, forlorn, swathed in heavy crape and haunted by ghosts and mutilated men—Paris seems to be accepting war like the rain, going soberly, philosophically, realistically about its business and its pleasures. The widow wears her veil with a most becoming grace, and the *mutilé* conceals his deformity under a smart uniform. There are still flowers on the quais and in the gardens, and couples of the special Parisian variety too, whom separation and "horizon-blue" have made more publicly and more profoundly tender than of old, so that a breath of tenacious life and poignant happiness rises into the cloudy autumnal sunsets and moon-rises. There is still food, delicious food, in the best restaurants of which he may freely partake, provided he has a long purse and a short memory for Hoover principles; are not French officers freely partaking? There is steam heat in his hotel—does not America provide the coal? There are still taxis—nothing in this "crisis" in gasolene. So he reasons, consciously or unconsciously, and if he has a civilian job, almost settles down in the midst of his fellow-Americans to believing war is not.

It was a shock to me, when I moved from a hotel where we had sweet desserts, and meat twice a day, even twice a meal, to find that a pound of sugar and 120 pounds of coal a month were all that I was allowed as a member of a French household. This means that we sweeten nothing but our tea, and choose between a fire for our feet and a fire for our roast. We have one small piece of meat for lunch and none for dinner, and the concierge wakes her little boy at 5:30 to stand in line for the morning milk. The cook's husband has been sent to Italy, and she occasionally asks me what all these Americans in uniform are doing

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in Paris. Do they never go to the front? The housemaid is a war widow and her mother in Burgundy writes her that the arrival of the American soldiers has tripled the cost of living. You can't buy an egg at any price. . . .

More and more is it borne in upon me that we have a great deal to live up to, to compensate for the inconvenience of our mere physical presence. What is not expected of the descendants of Washington and Lincoln? Up to the spring of 1917, we had been here in relatively small numbers, and, whether in the army, in the hospitals, or in relief work, we were volunteers and guests who generally possessed long pocketbooks, European outlooks and fluency in the French tongue. Now, on the contrary, we arrive as those having a right here, and a duty; yet we are generally ignorant of the language and daily habits of our ally and try instinctively and immediately to transform his ancient, hand-made, delicately adjusted civilization —a civilization which, in spite of this long invasion appears to have remained practically intact—into the hyper-modern, 10,000 horse-power, free and easy terms of Kansas, California and New York.

That is, theoretically at least, what the French themselves desire. Not only our democracy, our confident and generous youth, our vitality of mind, our fertility of invention, our vast material prosperity, but our efficiency and our scientific method have been a lyric theme, and it is felt that, especially in the industrial world, we can help to break many ancestral chains. Yet one hopes that some lover of the *comédie humaine* is making notes against a less solemn hour, of the actual encounter between the French manufacturer who points with pride to a factory unchanged since his grandfather's day and the American capitalist who asks when he is going to tear it down; between the New York business man, accustomed in five minutes' telephone conversation to start a train of events which will culminate within a week, and the French administrative official who, though war keeps him at his office from 8 a. m. to 9 p. m., has not abandoned his habit of longhand letters, long polite conversations, and long-deferred decisions; between the French peasant who makes his toilet in the barnyard, keeps his gold in a stocking, and lives frugally on vegetable soup in a house inherited from a revolutionary ancestor, and the sergeant from Ohio brought up in an apartment on enameled bath tubs and beefsteak, and who always pays with a cheque; between the poilu who has been holding two-thirds of the western front and a good share of the Oriental front through these bitter years on his pay of five sous a day, and the American private who finds the accumulation of his $1.25's scarcely sufficient to storm the biggest town near his camp on a Saturday night, and drive French colonels from their accustomed chairs to make way for his champagne supper.

The fact is that France and America are exactly in the position of two people who have become engaged by correspondence and are meeting for the first time in the flesh. The color of our hair, our fashion of blowing our noses, are mutually disconcerting. Yet to state these differences is to overstate them; they are only worth noting—deliberately from the French point of view—because we are committed, for the success of our effort here, to a common liberal understanding such as has seldom united two alien nations. On the cordially coöperative lines already established by the American Clearing House and by the American Ambulance Service, which brought young America into such living contact with the rank and file of the French Army, the American Red Cross—that vast and powerful organization—and the American Army are working out their daily routine; and though France has lost the habit of public demonstration—not a flag, or a cry after the victory of Verdun, not a protest in the trains or streets during the recent gravest hour of the war, when vast numbers of French troops were sent off to Italy —the name of President Wilson cannot be mentioned in a French gathering without long applause. It is impossible to persuade the citizen of the "liberated" part of northern France that we alone did not save him from starvation. The Belgian Relief Commission is known to him as the *Ravitaillement Américain.* As for the French woman of the people, that wrinkled and brown old sibyl from whose lips falls much of the wisdom of the race, she sees our "boys" arriving with a deep astonishment, and a deeper pity:

"I saw them at the movies," said my washerwoman, "such fine, big fellows—I couldn't bear to look at them. 'First ours, now yours,' I said to myself. Why did their mothers send them over to be killed? Why?"

"But this is our war too. . . ."

"You believe that? So far away? . . . But if you knew how we feel. . . . My Pierre, when he went back from his September permission—it's not gay going back to a fourth winter in the mud. '*T'en fais pas,*' he told me, '*ils sont là, les petits Américains.*' It's they who are going to save us."

Americans will gradually come to realize that they are doing Frenchmen an injustice in romanticizing their cause. They have gone about their job of soldiering as they used to do that of peasant, professor, workman, with absolutely no sense of being superman. Indeed, their daily effort is to minimize their pain, conceal their wounds under a

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twisted smile. (Said the heir to a great name, directing us to the ruins of his ancestral château, which the Germans had blown up with dynamite: "*Vous allez rigoler*"—in Broadway English "It's a scream!") If we can ever realize to what degree they are men and *galantes gens*, who have in blood and territory borne the brunt of the war, and still bear it steadfastly, we shall be doing them all the honor they deserve.

ELIZABETH SHEPLEY SERGEANT.

The Outlook on the West

A SUCCESSION of small wars waged by a professional army got English people into the habit of regarding war as a form of sport. The civilians sat in the grand stand watching the soldiers play in the enclosure. You had your pet soldier as you had your pet footballer, and you could back him against the others, but civilian "interference" in war was as irregular and was as bitterly resented as it would be if the spectators came off the grand stand and began to show the players how to play the game. This habit has persisted even to a war in which the conditions are too tragic for any resemblance to a game. There are no spectators in this war; we are all taking a hand in it. And yet how strong the old feeling still is against civilian "interference" was shown by the indignation roused by certain passages in Mr. Lloyd George's Paris speech. The Premier bore down his critics, but only by making it clear that the powers of the new international council were to be purely advisory and were not to over-ride the advice of the General Staff. You may criticize anything and everything in England now but not the General Staff. The unforgivable sin, which even a popular Premier may not commit with impunity, is to say that there is anything wrong with our western strategy.

Now it is no secret that Mr. Lloyd George was not a little sceptical about the soundness of our western strategy. In 1915, when we were beginning our premature offensives in France, he was an easterner, though perhaps he would have preferred an offensive to save Serbia to the offensive against Constantinople. In 1916, he bitterly felt the over-running of Rumania, and indeed his accession to power was mainly due to the popular indignation caused by that event. At the beginning of 1917 it looked as though Hindenburg was going to turn against Italy, and doubtless he would have done so but he wanted to test first the soundness of his new system of defense in France. The question then arose which was the better course: Should we put everything on the chance of a break-through on the west, or should we give Italy just that extra impulse which would carry her to Trieste, or possibly towards Vienna along Napoleon's old route of invasion? The Premier in his speech used words capable of the interpretation that he would have preferred the second alternative, but we must remember that he was arguing for unity of control, and his observations about possibilities on the Italian front may have been made to illustrate what he meant by unity of control, rather than as a definite statement of a policy that he would have preferred. However that may be, there is a good deal to be said for the view that just this extra momentum on the Italian front would have accomplished more than was in fact accomplished by our concentration on the west. Granting all this, granting too the necessity for unity of control, and above all for such Allied reinforcement of Italy as would enable our Allies to hold their front and save Venice, can we draw from what has happened any conclusions with regard to the future of Allied strategy?

As there is a certain embarrassment in discussing the prospects of Allied strategy, let us rather turn the thing around and regard it from the angle of the German Staff. Their principle, unlike ours, is to attack the weakest member of a coalition. Relieved of all anxiety on the side of Russia, they wanted to put Austria right on the side of Italy too, and they wanted to do it soon before American troops were ready to move. An Italian campaign presented the further advantage that it could go on all through the winter in comparative comfort. As regards the present situation the hill passes are bad, and the army service men of the German army will have a terrible time on the lines of communication, but down in the plains winter would bring no hardships, nothing to compare with the blood and mud of Flanders. But supposing they are stopped, and there is no chance of getting any further, what then? It is unlikely that they will leave the flower of their offensive strength holding trenches in the Italian plain. They will withdraw a percentage of their best troops, leaving older and inferior troops to hold these incomparably strong Alpine frontiers of Austria and will strike elsewhere. Turkey is perhaps in the greatest need, but Germany is not going to send great numbers of her troops there.

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The next claimant is Bulgaria and the best service that Germany could do her would be a campaign in Greece. Greece is essential to the maintenance of the central European bloc, and the probability therefore is that the moment the Italian offensive comes to a standstill, Germany, casting around for the weakest power, will attack Greece probably by the left wing of the Allied armies at Saloniki. Already there are signs of an Austrian move against Valona, the chief port of the Allies on the eastern Adriatic and a very important point in the strategy of the Balkan Peninsula. It is an additional recommendation of such a plan to the Germans that a campaign in Greece and Albania would probably also help Turkey by drawing off troops that might otherwise be very dangerous to her in the campaign of Palestine.

If this view of German strategy is correct, we have two preliminary questions to settle. First, what are the chances of a break-through on the west? Secondly, what are the chances of our rolling our stone up to the top of the Austrian Alps again and down on the other side? The idea of an offensive for Italy which may have been perfectly sound when the Italians were on the top of the hills, or nearly so, may be very wrong now that they are at the bottom. It must not be forgotten that these Austrian Alps are, next to the Indian northwest frontier, the strongest natural defenses in the world. As it was, the Italian frontier was very unfairly drawn along the crest of the lowest Alpine ridges; it took her armies two and a half years to get to the positions which she lost in the last German offensive, and she is now many miles behind the lines from which she started. The prospect of beginning the uphill climb once again is not very attractive. On the other hand, it is in favor of an offensive in Italy that Austria is weak and disposed to peace, and that her troops are very definitely of inferior quality to the Germans. If Austria were kept busy on the Italian front, her armies would certainly go back quicker than they did before.

Let us now take the other alternative of persistence in making our main offensive in Italy. In many ways this has been a disappointing year for the British and the French despite some very brilliant victories. At no point have we broken through, and our most tangible successes have come at the end of the year when the bad weather has made it extremely difficult to follow up our gains. But never before has the west presented such possibilities. On the Paaschendaele Ridge we are in a position which, if only there were less mud and the skies were a little clearer, would give us command of the maritime plain of Belgium in a month. We have not taken Lens but we are so near that the Germans cannot use it. Cambrai, too, great center of road and railway communications as it is, is in too exposed a position for the Germans to count on holding it. The same is true since the French victories on the Chemin des Dames, at Malmaison, and at Laon, which is the hinge on which turn the western and southern fronts of the Germans in France. On the analogy of what happened after the battle of the Somme, we should expect an extensive German retirement early next spring, and it is significant that the Germans latterly have been at pains to create the impression that they have no political ambition in France or Belgium, or at any rate no intention of making territorial acquisitions there. They would hardly have done that if they felt their military position in the west to be perfectly secure, for it is not the German way to surrender advantages lightly. But whether they have already made up their minds to retire or merely propose to retire if they are made, it is desirable that the Allies should be in sufficient force to assist their resolution.

These two alternatives do not of course exhaust all the possibilities of the war. There is the problem of Turkey to be considered, and also the problem of defending Greece against the risks of a German offensive. But the choice between the two main alternatives would undoubtedly determine the course of the war so far as the Allies were concerned. If we chose to persist in the western offensive, our policy in Italy and in Macedonia would be defensive in its character. If, on the other hand, we decided for a vigorous offensive in Italy, we should have to draw in our military ambitions on the west, though any weakening of Austria would of course greatly increase the chances of a successful offensive in Macedonia. The military break-down of Russia will, if it is permanent, relieve Germany of her principal anxiety in this war, which was that she had to fight on two fronts and to carry her partner, Austria, who occupied an exceedingly important position as a connecting link between Germany and the east. It is a question that will have to be very seriously considered whether we may not have in the future to make out of the Italian front some sort of equivalent to the Russian front, which has now ceased to give Germany any anxiety. These are merely examples of the kind of questions that the new international council will have to decide. America, it is to be hoped, will shortly be represented on that council, and her clear impartial judgment will probably turn the scale on these and other doubtful points where opinion is now pretty evenly balanced.

HERBERT SIDEBOTHAM.

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Public Education on Trial

SOCIAL situations are never simple, and in wartime nothing is simple, save emotion. The educational conditions leading up to the dismissal of three teachers in a New York high school afford no exception to this statement. Guidance through the maze may be had, however, by reviewing the matter as a culmination of the established and traditional relationship of official superiors and inferiors in the school system, and as evidence of a sharp clash between two opposed social and educational philosophies. But since these causes have been exasperated by war conditions and war psychology, it is first necessary to say something about the "loyalty" aspect of the matter.

Almost up to the time of the meeting at which the men were dismissed, a reader of at least the editorial columns of the newspapers would have derived the impression that the teachers were accused of disloyalty of some degree or other. But by the time of the final meeting the prosecution had settled on another formula. The men were not charged with overt disloyalty; they were charged with a lack of that active or aggressive loyalty which the state has a right to demand, in war time particularly, from its paid servants. Now lack, absence, is a negative thing; it is notoriously difficult to prove except when the thing at issue is definite and tangible. Opinions even among experts differ as to the precise constitution of loyal patriotism; no burden of standardization has ever settled upon the exact tests by which its absence is to be determined.

The observer who bears in mind the negative character of the charge will have the key to many of the otherwise inexplicable phenomena of the testimony (I say testimony rather than evidence advisedly) and the trial. Ordinarily a person is innocent till proved guilty. The charge of absence of something, that something not being clearly defined, shifts the burden. Anybody may then safely be considered guilty until he can present convincing evidence that he is in possession of the required article—which is, perhaps, one reason why negative charges have not been encouraged in the legal procedure of more enlightened countries. Moreover, charges of lack or absence encourage suspicion. With the multiplication of accusations and loyalty pledges in the schools—pledges which naturally such pro-Germans as there are sign with the greatest regularity and cheerfulness—the situation was approaching the point exemplified in the old tale: "There is nobody in the congregation orthodox but you and me—and I am not quite sure about you." There follows another lack than that of active and aggressive loyalty, namely, a lack of intellectual scrupulousness in making and weighing charges. The lack of active loyalty is assumed to be so widespread that a sacrificial offering, even if somewhat vicarious, will be welcome to the God of Hosts. It is absurd to be too particular about positive evidence to prove the lack of a thing. There are suspicious circumstances; to punish this man will at least arouse others to a less passive patriotism.

One who reads the volume of testimony with these things in mind will have little difficulty in understanding either its concentration upon views rather than acts, views which might be entertained on various hypothetical occasions rather than any views ever actually uttered, or its desire to entrap individuals into obnoxious statements. Such an atmosphere breeds suspicion, accusation and violent action, the phenomena of Inquisition, whether of Torquemada, Salem, the Committee of Public Safety of the French Revolution, Lenine, or New York School authorities.

All this, however, concerns the spirit and atmosphere, the local color, of the school episode rather than its substance, or structure. These are to be sought, as has already been said, in the only too well established methods of school administration with respect to teachers. Quite independently of this episode, one of the least sensational of our school superintendents, Mr. Arthur Perry, has written a pamphlet regarding the problem confronting the new Board of Education. In it he frankly states that there is a general feeling that the building of the Board of Education is a circumlocution office; that there is practically no city-wide esprit de corps among the teachers; that because of this lack the "tremendous amount of enthusiasm and intelligence in the more than twenty thousand members is going pitiably to waste"; that the devotion of teachers to pupils—which is general—is due to dictates of individual conscience, rather than to leadership, and that the feeling is widespread among teachers that instead of looking to their immediate employers, the Board of Education, for support and aid, they must rather protect themselves *against* their employers by using the pressure of legislation or of public opinion to secure "even ordinary consideration."

This is a temperate, and even tempered, statement. It indicates the background upon which a particular difficulty has been projected. If there has been a lack of "active" loyalty in support of the war, the charge affects not three alone nor yet thirty nor three hundred. But what it reflects is not lack of individual loyalty, but just this absence of leadership on the part of nominal leaders, an undermined esprit de corps, a widespread scepticism and even cynicism, the immediate responsibil-

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ity for which does not lie at the door of the teaching staff. Not merely the accused teachers but the teaching force has been left without inspiration, and the guidance of any constructive policy and hence exposed to every sort of irresponsible interference and amateur pressure.

It is matter of common knowledge that the strain in the relations between superior and inferior and the general unrest in the teaching staff have been on the steady increase during the latter years of the Mitchel administration. To the teachers that administration presented its most brutal face. All of the better informed of the friends of the now defunct Gary system in New York have been aware for some time that its success was fundamentally compromised if not doomed by the autocratic way in which it was formulated and imposed from above. Under Mr. Churchill, the cultivation of more coöperative relations with the teaching staff had begun; after the fusion administration broke with him, the situation became largely that described by Carlyle as anarchy plus the constable's club.

New York memories are proverbially short. But if any one will turn back to the newspapers of the pre-election days he will find them full of school riots and school strikes, for which the fusion campaign managers with the ineptitude which characterized their almost every act were holding, by name, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Somers and other members of the Board of Education, responsible. Pupils of De Witt Clinton High School were active in a strike against the imposition of the longer (seven hour) school day. The merits or demerits of this lengthened school day are of little account for present purposes in comparison with the fact that it presented one more autocratic decree and imposition from above. The teachers immediately affected were not even consulted as to its probable effects or the best way of administering it so as to mitigate the hardships it would work upon the many pupils who spent part of their time in earning money to continue at school. Provoked by these riots and strikes, and presumably as a Tammany man not particularly pleased at having them unjustly charged to Tammany, Mr. Whalen, the chairman of the High School Committee of the Board of Education, said that he would close the schools rather than allow teachers and pupils to "*run them.*"

This utterance seems to have furnished the proverbial straw. Members of the school council, most of whom are among the dismissed and transferred teachers, prepared resolutions condemning Mr. Whalen's attitude as autocratic and called a meeting of the teachers of the school which passed the resolutions almost unanimously. The Inquisition followed. There is no evidence that Mr. Whalen himself instigated it. The variety and number of the coincidences with respect to the teachers called and not called, the questions asked, etc., amount to a mathematical demonstration of the connection between the two things. It was no accident that the inquiry began in and concerns teachers in the De Witt Clinton High School. Moreover this action on the part of teachers in that school did not stand alone. Before this episode the school had been famous—or if any one will, infamous—as a center of unrest, of independence, and of protest against autocratic administration. If an example was needed, here was the place to begin. If specific charges of insubordination had been brought, the hearing might have cleared the air. Underlying causes of friction would have been brought out and the public been placed in a position to determine the balance of rights and wrongs. But it was more tactful to leave the indictment vague and to establish a subtle association between lack of loyalty to official superiors and to the nation.

The direct clash of educational philosophies as to methods of teaching and discipline in dealing with pupils presents the same conflict from another angle. The situation between teachers and pupils corresponds, point for point as the mathematicians say, to that between teachers and their employers. Hence the phrases "teaching instinctive obedience" and "respect for authority as such" (with true metaphysical emphasis upon the "as such") are permanent contributions of the trial to pedagogical literature. Teachers who do not instil in pupils blind "doglike" fealty to every kind of authority are not likely themselves to yield it. Teachers who regard the possibility of utilizing their own thoughtful experience as an important factor in conducting the schools will respect the intelligence of their pupils. This defines the fundamental issue. Is automatic routine habit or the development of habits of reflective consideration to be the dominant aim of teaching and discipline? Never has it been revealed more clearly that the latter is "dangerous" and the former "safe"—dangerous to whom and safe for whom being carefully concealed save as the subtle association with disloyalty may be insinuated. In spite, then, of the temporary prestige which war psychology may give to automatic habit over against thoughtfulness as an educational end, progressives might, were it not for danger of injustice to individuals, well be grateful to the reactionaries for having the issue so unambiguously set forth. The fact that this conflict of ideals and principles is the source of a multitude of other clashes and discrepancies is usually overlaid with irrelevant mat-

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ter and ornamentally concealed with eulogistic phraseology. The trial has brought it out in a bald, naked, uncompromised form. The record stands. Like most reactionary triumphs after the issue is once revealed, the record will become a milestone in the history of the gradual victory of a progressive over a reactionary social and educational philosophy.

JOHN DEWEY.

Between Two Stools

ONLY those who do not know my husband, James Wilbur, will think I exaggerate when I say that never before today has his conduct flooded my heart with doubt. Errors of judgment not a few have been his, acts conceived and executed in wrath, but never before, when I surveyed his course in a spirit of calmness, have I been at a loss to decide whether James did right or did wrong.

Far be it from me to seek refuge in the assertion that he acted for the best. Such a plea, as James himself has often told me very kindly, is ever the refuge to which feeble minds and unstable wills resort. It avails not at all to reassure myself by repeating that his intentions were good. When were they aught else? The unalterable fact remains that James has brought not peace and strength upon the parish, but distraction.

Everyone is aware that the Reverend Jonathan Skene was once beloved by his parishioners. His saintly face, seen Sunday after Sunday as he stood at the lectern or in the pulpit of St. Peter's, was for many years an inspiration to us all. Even of late, when his peculiarly sweet voice had begun to fail, it could still be heard in every corner of the church, doubtless owing to the excellent acoustic properties of the sacred edifice. When we moved St. Peter's up town James, as junior warden, had kept reminding our architect that God's word must be audible.

Until the Russians saw fit to have their revolution Dr. Skene was staunch about the war. Not a word did he utter with which right-feeling and right-thinking men and women could disagree. Very early, and oh! how persuasively, did he set forth his reasons for deeming participation in the cataclysm to be the duty of the United States. But with the advent of the Russian revolution came a change which James deplored. Dr. Skene fell into an unaccountable and most unchristian hopefulness. Less and less did he seem able to realize that the revolution would never have happened if the revolutionists had not wanted land that did not belong to them. Land is property, as James often warned him, and property is thrift.

Not many weeks ago Dr. Skene brought on the climax by preaching a sermon which stirred James to the depths of his nature. James does not wish to be unjust. He admits that Dr. Skene is not blind to the contemptible character of certain Bolshevik leaders. Dr. Skene in that very sermon acknowledged that some of them might be selfish, unpatriotic, corrupt men, in Germany's pay. If he had stopped there he might still be Rector of St. Peter's. Unfortunately, instead of knowing when to stop, he went on to make a distinction between the Bolshevik leaders and the Russian peasants as a whole. Blind they may be, he declared, these Russian peasants, unknowing and misled, guilty of a folly which can only prolong the war or bring it to a disastrous close. Yet by many words and tokens, so he said, you shall know the Russian people for children of the new dispensation. Have they not obeyed the command which bids us agree with our adversary quickly whiles we are in the way with him? They resist not evil, they are ready to love their enemies. And we? We revile these Russian peasants, we would persecute them if we could, we are tempted into the sin of calling these our brothers fools. Fools they may be, Dr. Skene concluded, yet is not theirs a folly which Our Lord would set above the wisdom of the wise? Where else is the truth so manifest as in Russia that the children of light are not so wise as the children of this world? If Our Lord were alive today he would be nowhere more at home than in Russia.

James came out of church amazed and very stern. He called upon Dr. Skene between services. Meeting the Doctor upon his own ground James asked rather sharply whether Our Lord had not said, in that very Sermon on the Mount to which the Doctor had adverted, Take no thought for your life? The Russians, James pointed out, are not true peace-makers, since no one but a German or a pro-German would for one moment think of calling them the Children of God. Neither are they truly meek, James added, as is proved by the fact that they have not yet inherited the earth, much though they want to.

I could not imagine how Dr. Skene could answer that argument. James says he did not even try. The Doctor's manner was gentle, but his mind was closed to the truth. His face, as James recollects having phrased it at the meeting held a few days later, a secret meeting of course, was that of a gentle fanatic. Dr. Skene stuck to his assertion that in spite of the harm they had done and would do there was something Christian about the behavior and spirit of the Russian peasants, something which Our Lord would have rather liked. I think it blasphemous to talk of Him in that familiar

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way, but James says we must not be harsh. Just, but not harsh.

What happened next is so painful that I cannot bring myself to dwell upon it. The leading minds of St. Peter's decided that Dr. Skene must be asked to resign, and that this unpleasant request should be proffered by James. I think it was cowardly to make James do this all by himself, but he says it was a natural choice, given his undeserved reputation for a certain authoritative tact. He performed his delicate mission by firmly yet quietly telling Dr. Skene it was the sentiment of St. Peter's that he had become one of those against whom the Bible warns us when it says, Woe unto him by whom the offense cometh. The Doctor seems to have taken the blow extremely well, merely saying he was sincerely sorry to part from his old friends, and that of course he would resign at once. Only on one point was he unreasonable. He insisted, actually insisted, that somebody be appointed to agree with him upon a statement of facts to be made public.

You may have been wondering all this while how I can question the rightness of James's conduct. Up to this point I do not question it, of course. He did the only thing possible. Dr. Skene's resignation was inevitable anyway, and its date was probably advanced only a few weeks or so by the use James made of his influence in the parish. No shadow of doubt darkened my mind until last Sunday, when the Reverend Lazarus Bodie preached his first sermon as Rector of St. Peter's.

Mr. Bodie came to us highly recommended. Before we decided to call him, James and one or two other men journeyed all the way west to Cleveland to hear him in his own pulpit. They were impressed both by Mr. Bodie's sermon and by the good appearance he made socially. And indeed his manner is extremely good, so Anglican in fact that I could hardy believe my ears when I heard him describe himself as a graduate of Ann Arbor or some place of that sort.

But last Sunday! I shall never forget last Sunday. Mr. Bodie read the service extremely well. He pronounced the word " erred " in two syllables, which always gives me a feeling of confidence in a clergyman, and did two or three other things so misleading that as I look back I can scarcely help questioning his sincerity. But it wasn't insincerity that was the matter with his sermon. He was terribly sincere. He meant every word of it, and such words!

This war, he said, has been called the Great War. It has been called by other names. All are inaccurate. It should be called the War that is Misunderstood. This war has set the clock back more than two thousand years, back to before the day when Christ was born. Some time in the future we may win our way to Christianity again. That time is far off. In the present world there is no place for the Christian spirit. As the Israelitish dispensation was abolished by the First Coming of Christ, so the Christian dispensation has been abolished by this war, which marks His Going. Years hence we may regain our cherished right to practice gentleness, renunciation, forgiveness, love. Today we have no such right. For the present and the near future our duty is to worship the God revealed to us in the Old Testament, to imitate His example, to obey His commands. And what were these commands? Raising his voice until I fairly shuddered, the Reverend Lazarus Bodie answered his own question. Thus, he shouted, thus saith the Lord: Thou shalt consume all the people which the Lord thy God shall deliver thee. Thine eye shall have no pity upon them. Of the cities of these people thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth. Kill every male among the little ones. Back, Mr. Bodie continued, with a sudden drop in his voice that I own I found thrilling, back to the God Who said, and from Whom we must learn to say: I will also send wild beasts among you, which shall rob you of your children, and destroy your cattle and make you few in number. And ye shall eat the flesh of your sons, and the flesh of your daughters shall ye eat. And upon them that are left alive of you I will send a faintness into their hearts in the lands of their enemies, and the sound of a shaken leaf shall chase them.

Of course Mr. Bodie will have to leave St. Peter's. There is only one opinion in the parish about that. The difference of opinion is all about James, whose enemies are saying he ought to have made certain in advance that Mr. Bodie was the man to range Our Lord's teachings squarely behind the grim work before us and our Allies. And in my own heart there is a horrid doubt. Has my James been guilty, for the first time in his life, of a sin of omission?

Meanwhile, as if James hadn't enough to bear, he is having trouble with poor old Dr. Skene, who has not to this day performed the obvious duty of agreeing with James about that statement of the facts which led up to his resignation. They had almost agreed when Mr. Bodie spoiled everything by preaching his dreadful sermon. This, as James said, would expose any baldly literal statement about Dr. Skene to all sorts of misconstruction. People might accuse St. Peter's of rejecting both Testaments, the Old and the New, which would be unjust all round.

DOROTHEA WILBUR.

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A Statement by Charles A. Beard

IT has been insinuated by certain authorities of Columbia University that I resigned in a fit of unjustified petulance, and I, therefore, beg to submit the following statement:

1. My first real experience with the inner administration of the university came with the retirement of Professor John W. Burgess. For sometime before his withdrawal, his work in American constitutional law had been carried by Professor X and it was the desire of the members of the faculty that the latter should be appointed Ruggles Professor to succeed Mr. Burgess. But Mr. X had published a book in which he justified criticism of the Supreme Court as a means of bringing our constitutional law into harmony with our changing social and economic life. He was therefore excluded from the Ruggles professorship. It was given to Mr. W. D. Guthrie, a successful corporation lawyer, and a partner of one of the trustees of the University. It was understood that Mr. Guthrie should give one lecture a week for one semester each year, in return for the high honor. Mr. Butler is constantly saying that all matters relating to appointment, fitness, and tenure are left to the appropriate faculties, or words to this effect. As a matter of plain fact the Faculty of Political Science as such was not consulted in advance in the selection of the Ruggles professor. The whole affair was settled by backstairs negotiation, and it was understood by all of us who had any part in the business that no person with progressive or liberal views would be acceptable. Mr. Guthrie was duly appointed. Of his contributions to learning I shall not speak, but I can say that he did not attend faculty meetings, help in conducting doctors' examinations, or assume the burdens imposed upon other professors. This was the way in which the first important vacancy in the Faculty of Political Science was filled after my connection with the institution.

2. My second experience with the administration of the University came in 1916. On April 21st of that year I delivered an address before the National Conference of Community Centers in which I advocated the use of the schools as the centers for the discussion of public questions. A few weeks before, a speaker at one of the school forums was alleged to have said, "To Hell with the Flag," and for that reason a number of persons had urged the closing of school centers altogether. Indeed, some of the speakers at the above mentioned conference advocated a sort of censorship for all school forums. In my address I merely took the reasonable and moderate view that the intemperance of one man should not drive us into closing the schools to others. The reports in the newspapers, with one exception, were fairly accurate. But one sensational sheet accused me of approving the sentiment, "To Hell with the Flag." Dr. Butler, who had had large experience with frenzied journalism quite rightly took the view that I had been the victim of the headline writer and advised me to do my best to correct the wrong impression and then forget it. I immediately wrote to all of the papers and sought to remove the misunderstanding that had arisen.

Nevertheless I was summoned before the committee on education of the board of trustees. I complied because I wanted to clear up any wrong impressions which the members entertained concerning the nature of my address before the Community Center conference.

As soon as the committee of the trustees opened the inquiry I speedily disposed of the "flag incident," by showing that I had said nothing that could be construed as endorsing in any way the objectionable language in question. No one doubted my word. Indeed I had available abundant testimony from reliable men and women who had heard the address. The record was thus soon set straight.

The inquiry as to the flag incident being at an end I prepared to leave the room when I was utterly astonished to have Mr. Bangs and Mr. Coudert launch into an inquisition into my views and teachings. For half an hour I was "grilled" by these gentlemen. Dr. Butler and certain colleagues from the Faculty of Political Science (who were present at the inquisition) made no attempt to stop the proceedings. Mr. Coudert, who had once privately commended my book on the Constitution as "admirably well done," and opening up "a most fertile field," denounced my teachings in vigorous language, in which he was strongly seconded by Mr. Bangs. I realize now that I should have refused to remain in the room, but I was taken unaware and stunned by the procedure. When the inquisitors satisfied themselves, the chairman of the committee ordered me to warn all other men in my department against teachings "likely to inculcate disrespect for American institutions. I repeated my order to my colleagues who received it with a shout of derision, one of them asking me whether Tammany Hall and the pork barrel were not American institutions!

I reported to my colleagues in the Faculty of Political Science that I had been subjected by the committee of the trustees to a "general doctrinal inquisition," and urged them, at an informal meeting, to establish a rule that a professor should be examined in matters of opinion only by his peers, namely men of standing in his profession. Several caucuses of the Faculty were held and it was generally agreed that the proceedings of the trustees were highly reprehensible. Action doubtless should have been taken by the Faculty at the time if we had not been told by Dean Woodbridge that "the trustees had learned their lesson and that such an inquisition would never happen again." We were also informed that some of the trustees were "after" President Butler for his pacifist writings and affiliations and that if the Faculty took a firm stand in matters of doctrinal inquisition an open conflict might ensue. In a long conversation President Butler urged me to drop the whole "miserable business" and go on about my work.

For the sake of "peace" I consented. I could not forget, however, the cases of Professor Kendrick and Dr. Fraser who had been haled before the committee of the trustees on the trivial charge that they had criticized Plattsburg and military discipline at a student meeting some time early in 1916. Their cases I regarded as peculiarly open to objection because they were not even accused of saying anything that was indecent or vulgar or unpatriotic. Nevertheless, I dropped the whole matter on the assurance that such an inquisition would not happen

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again and that the trustees "had learned their lesson."

3. Though I did not agree with some of my exuberant colleagues that a "great battle for academic freedom had been won," I was ready to abide by their decision. Then, to our utter astonishment, the trustees at their March meeting in 1917 gave to the press a set of resolutions instructing a committee "to inquire and ascertain" whether certain doctrines were being taught in the University. President Butler, in whose name we had been assured that no such inquisition would ever happen again, avoided the issue by taking a vacation and leaving the Faculties to deal with the situation.

The action of the Faculty of Political Science was prompt. An informal meeting was held at which a resolution in the following tenor was unanimously adopted: "Whereas the resolution of the trustees by its very terms implies a general doctrinal inquisition, insults the members of the Faculty by questioning their loyalty to their country, violates every principle of academic freedom, and betrays a profound misconception of the true function of the university in the advancement of learning, *Be it resolved* that we will not individually or collectively lend any countenance to such an inquiry." The trustees were forced to abandon their plan for a general inquisition. Indeed, when they learned of the spirit of the Faculty of Political Science and other faculties, they hastily disclaimed any intention of making a "doctrinal inquiry"—as their resolution of March, 1917, clearly implied.

It was agreed that such matters should be handled in coöperation with a committee of nine representing the faculties.

4. Notwithstanding this promise of coöperation on the part of the trustees and the committee of nine representing the teaching force, the trustees ignored the recommendations of that committee in the cases of Professors Dana and Cattell and dismissed these gentlemen summarily in the autumn of 1917, after wrongfully charging them with grave crimes of treason and sedition. Professor John Dewey resigned from the committee of nine and the body which was to safeguard the interests of the professors collapsed in ignominy.

5. Some time before Professors Cattell and Dana were expelled, another professor was summarily thrown out of the University without warning or trial. No reasons for his expulsion were advanced and a polite inquiry addressed by his colleagues to President Butler asking for information remained unanswered.

6. Dr. Leon Fraser was an instructor in Politics in Columbia College. With this office he combined that of assistant to Dean Keppel and Dr. Butler in the Association for International Conciliation. Dr. Fraser was assigned the task of organizing courses in colleges throughout the country on pacifism and international conciliation. In other words, he was paid by these gentlemen to engage in pacifist propaganda. In a moment of youthful enthusiasm, early in 1916, Dr. Fraser made some critical remark about the military camp at Plattsburg. For this he was haled before a committee of the trustees. A year later, namely, in the spring of 1917, my department was warned not to re-nominate Dr. Fraser for re-appointment because he was not acceptable to Mr. Bangs, one of the trustees. In spite of our orders we did re-nominate Dr. Fraser, but before action could be taken by the trustees, he, along with other instructors was dropped, on the assumption that the war would reduce materially the number of students in the college. But not content with dropping him, Mr. Butler informed the College authorities that in case the attendance in the college in the autumn warranted the appointment of additional instructors, under no circumstances should Dr. Fraser be re-nominated. In truth, therefore, if not in theory, Dr. Fraser was expelled from the College without notice or hearing. In view of the fact that Mr. Fraser had been inspired by Mr. Butler and Mr. Keppel to engage in pacifist propaganda and had been paid by them for doing it, it seemed to me that they should at least have demanded and insisted upon having a full and fair hearing of the charges against their youthful adherent, especially as those charges grew out of his "pacifist" teachings.

7. We are informed by Dr. Butler that nominations for appointment and promotions come from the Faculties. Such may be the theory, but it is the practice for the trustees and president to warn the committees in charge of appointments and promotions against recommending "unacceptable" persons. For example, when the committee on instruction of the Faculty of Political Science, of which I was a member, was considering promotions last spring, it was informed at the outset by "the committee of one on rumor from the president's office" that "certain of the trustees" would not approve the promotion of Professor Y because he had used "disrespectful language" in speaking of the Supreme Court. Professor Y was not recommended for promotion and the trustees could proudly say that they had not rejected a faculty recommendation!

Mr. Butler cannot conceive of a scholar's entertaining progressive ideas. Once, in asking me to recommend an instructor to a neighboring college, he distinctly pointed out that a man of "Bull Moose" proclivities would not be acceptable.

8. Early in October, 1917, I was positively and clearly informed by two responsible officers of the University that another doctrinal inquisition was definitely scheduled for an early date. It was the evident purpose of a small group of the trustees (unhindered, if not aided, by Mr. Butler) to take advantage of the state of war to drive out or humiliate or terrorize every man who held progressive, liberal, or unconventional views on political matters in no way connected with the war. The institution was to be reduced below the level of a department store or factory and I therefore tendered my resignation.

I make no claims in behalf of academic freedom, though I think they are worthy of consideration. I have merely held that teachers should not be expelled without a full and fair hearing by their peers, surrounded by all of the safeguards of judicial process. Professors in Columbia University have been subjected to humiliating doctrinal inquisitions by the trustees, they have been expelled without notice or hearing, and their appointment and promotion depend upon securing, in advance, the favor of certain trustees. Without that favor scholarship and learning avail nothing.

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These facts I submit to the candid and impartial reader. I believe that they constitute a full and unanswerable indictment of the prevailing methods at Columbia University under the administration of Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler.

CHARLES A. BEARD.

CORRESPONDENCE

Sir Gilbert Murray's Reviewer

SIR: As I care a good deal what The New Republic thinks of me, I will venture to do what is generally an unwise thing—to remonstrate on one point with your reviewer of my book, War, Faith and Policy.

Only on one point, where I think he has missed my purpose.

He collects a few passages in which I praise the British tradition in politics, appeal to old English Liberalism, or describe certain kinds of misconduct as "un-English," and he easily makes the impression that I am indulging in a bout of Jingo self-glorification. I would like him to remember two things; first, that these essays were written for an English audience which naturally does not take such an unfavorable view as he does of the English character; secondly, that these appeals are always made with a definite purpose, with which he would, I am sure, sympathize.

There are two horrors threatening us in this war; one is defeat by Germany, the other is national degradation and brutalization. I try to work as hard against one as against the other. And surely the best way to induce people not to sink to their lowest is to show faith in their highest. When you yourself, sir, have to protest against some symptom of war-fever—reprisals on the innocent, war-after-the-war or the like—are you sure you will never appeal to the pride of the American people in their own traditions, and say to them plainly, "You are too great and generous a people to descend to these dishonors"? At any rate, if you do, I shall not blame you as a Jingo boaster.

Or will your reviewer answer that America has a right to be proud of herself whereas England should only be ashamed? I wonder.

GILBERT MURRAY.

London, England.

The Facts as to Women in War Industries

SIR: The article on Women in War Industries which appeared in your columns last week contains a number of mis-statements which need correction. Comment on labor matters in The New Republic usually shows so much insight and sympathetic understanding, that I am the more at pains to correct the most obvious errors and the resulting misapprehension of the actual facts.

It is true as the writer states that the government has been incredibly slow since the war began in gathering official information on the condition of women wage earners and in leading the way to their effective employment, although the experience of Great Britain and other warring countries had already proved how extensively the war industries would depend upon their labor. Even at this time there is no central agency effectively distributing these workers, providing the industrial training that is needed, and supervising the conditions of labor. But it is altogether misleading for the article to suggest remedies based on a misconception of the function of the various government departments and other agencies.

The writer, for instance, makes the extraordinary statement that "the Department of Labor has decided to refuse government contracts to homeworkers but nothing is done to enforce this ruling." She is evidently ignorant of the fact that this department of the federal government gives out no contracts for manufacturing war supplies, and has never made or ceased to make contracts with homeworkers. In another connection she naïvely remarks that "Mrs. Florence Kelly has started to investigate uniform making."

The truth behind these two statements is that since last August the Board of Control of Labor Standards for Army Clothing, of which Mr. Louis E. Kirstein is chairman and Mrs. Florence Kelly secretary, has been actively at work under the Quartermaster-General.

In giving the reasons for establishing this Board, Secretary Baker said:

"The government cannot permit its work to be done under sweatshop conditions, and it cannot allow the evils widely complained of to go uncorrected. Only through the establishment of such a body as the Board of Control now created will the government be assured that army clothing is manufactured under recognized industrial standards and in an atmosphere of good-will between manufacturers and operatives. This alone will assure fit clothing and its prompt delivery for army needs."

It is now an accomplished fact that in New York City, the great center of the industry, no uniforms are being made in sweatshops.

The writer comments also on the work of the National Committee on Women in Industry and its subcommittees saying that "they are hampered . . . . because their function is advisory to the government" and that they therefore cannot "openly denounce night work for women" in one of the navy yards.

As its secretary I wish to explain that the committee has never been in a position where it could not express its disapproval of such flagrant violation of hygienic safeguards as requiring women to work at night. Many months ago, in its standards for work on war supplies, it recommended to the government that women should not be so employed, and that they should be allowed at least eight hours rest at night. The subcommittee on Foreign-Born Women sent out bulletins to the foreign language press containing the standards of the committee in order to inform these women of the steps being taken for their protection. But this committee did not, as this article charges, urge them to refuse to work on night shifts.

The article further concludes that the committees are "hampered by a lack of coöperation among themselves." "Orthodox trade unionists wish action to come chiefly from the organized workers, while social workers want government protection." It should be stated that there has never been a difference of opinion in the committee regarding its program. On the contrary, there is entire agreement that the government, as employer, should above all others establish model industrial conditions. The trade union members are as eager as the social workers to have the government establish such conditions in its own plants, and also stipulate that similar standards shall be adopted by private manufacturers having contracts from the government. Organized labor agrees with this policy. It has representation on the adjustment committees which are being created under the terms of the contracts whenever

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disputes are likely to arise, and can thus make the demands of labor effectively felt.

To deal successfully with labor difficulties through such a mechanism as an adjustment committee, calls for high qualities of patience and tolerance on both sides, as well as an unusual degree of administrative ability. In face of the vast difficulties of putting the government's new policy into practical effect, it is an assumption indeed for a writer to conclude with the remark that "if the Advisory Committees would agree on the necessary steps to be taken . . . it would be a simple matter to put into operation."

How much women are to share the benefits of the new procedure is now a matter of urgent interest. Thus far the women wage earners, being largely unorganized, have been less articulate in their demands than the men, and have shown the need of help from outside agencies to make their just complaints known. In so far as your article shows the failure to call on the well organized women's committees for aid in such ways, it has performed a useful service.

PAULINE GOLDMARK.

New York City.

A Christian Victory?

SIR: It is a sad commentary upon the democratic nature of modern civilization that the occupation of Jerusalem by the British should have been hailed more as a Christian victory than as the deliverance of an oppressed people from a tyrannical autocracy. Most of the American papers have expressed their joy over the deliverance of the holy city from Moslem yoke, forgetting that the army which claims the credit of the achievement is very largely composed of non-Christians. The British force operating in Palestine contains a larger number of Hindus and Mohammedans than Christians, and it is absurd to talk of it as a Christian victory. Woe to humanity and democracy both if this great war eventually ends in assuming a religious character. Those really interested in democracy can not look at this phase but with alarm. The complete elimination of Islam as a political power, if achieved, is likely to be the greatest menace to the future peace of the world. I hope and trust that the United States will not be a party to any such arrangement as denies an independent political existence to Moslem countries.

LAJPAT RAI.

New York City.

American Income Tax

SIR: In the issue of December 15th of The New Republic, under the heading, Taxation vs. Loans Once More, you state: "Even today it (the war tax on incomes) is surpassed only by the British tax."

Permit me to point out that this statement is only partially correct. The American tax on incomes up to $600,000 is lower than in England, leaving out of account our state and municipal taxes. The American tax on incomes over $600,000 is higher on still larger incomes much higher than the corresponding tax in England. The American tax on small and moderate incomes is but a fraction of the corresponding tax in England.

The maximum rate of British income taxation is 42½ per cent.

The American scale of income taxation rises to a maximum rate of 67 per cent. The American average rate advances from 42½ per cent on incomes of $600,000 to about 63 per cent on what may be termed maximum incomes. These rates do not include, of course, the percentage payable under our excess profit tax which is not, as in England, a tax on war profits only, but simply an additional income tax.

On the other hand, the English rate of taxation on incomes of, say, $3,000, $5,000, $10,000 and $15,000, respectively, averages 14 per cent, 16 per cent, 20 per cent, respectively. In America, the corresponding rates are ⅔ of 1 per cent., 1½ per cent, 3½ per cent and about 5 per cent (or, if we add the "occupation" tax, in the cases where that tax applies, our total federal taxation on incomes of $10,000 is 6¾ per cent, and on incomes of $15,000 9¾ per cent, as against an income tax of 20 per cent and 25 per cent respectively in England).

It may be worth mentioning in this connection that the American inheritance tax is far higher than the analogous tax in England or anywhere else, rising, as it does, to a maximum of 27½ per cent on direct descendants, apart from the various state inheritance taxes. In England the maximum inheritance tax is 20 per cent.

It may also be interesting to record that of her total actual war expenditures (exclusive of loans to her Allies and interest on war loans), England has raised less than 15 per cent by taxation, (France and Germany far less), while America is about to raise by taxation approximately 28 per cent of her total war requirements (exclusive of loans to the Allied nations and of the amount to be invested in mercantile ships, which being a productive investment, cannot properly be classed amongst war expenditures).

The test of war taxes is what they produce. It is an old and often tested axiom that excessive or unwisely adjusted taxes destroy their own productivity. The ill-balanced and unscientific measure adopted by Congress last October has done more than any other factor to disturb and lame business and thereby to diminish the funds available for taxation. I have no doubt that a revenue measure could be evolved without much difficulty, which, while taking no less account of the dictates of social justice than the taxation scheme adopted by Congress, would produce a considerably larger revenue and still would weigh less heavily on the people at large and impede far less the country's business.

OTTO H. KAHN.

New York City.

An Appeal from a Belgian

[The following letter has been received by The New Republic.]

MR. Editor-in-Chief: Forgive me my daring in writing you these few words.

I am a Belgian interned soldier and should like very much to receive, for collecting, used postage stamps, helping me to pass the longness of my captivity.

I dare hope, Mr. Editor-in-Chief, you will be so kind to insert in your esteemed paper an advertisement for which I thank you very much beforehand.

With all my kindest regards, I remain, sir,

Yours respectfully,

JOHN CORTHALS.

Belgian Interned Soldier,
Amersfoort, Holland.

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At the Capitol

The Senate Begins an Inquiry

WHY is an investigation of shortages in coal and sugar being conducted by a Committee on Manufactures? Coal matters are regularly handled in the Senate by the Committee on Mines. It was the Committee on Agriculture which drew the provisions under which Mr. Hoover's Food Administration now exercises control over sugar. Inviting the Committee on Manufactures to cross its own boundary lines and investigate this territory is like instructing the Committee on Useless Papers to draw the next irrigation bill. Nevertheless, in his resolution calling for an investigation, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge specifically selected the Committee on Manufactures to do the work. For what reason?

One turns to a recent record of the Committee's activity, expecting to find signs of specialized training in the way of investigations—training so specialized, in fact, as to make logical the present employment of the Committee in a field foreign to its ordinary pursuits. And the record shows that in recent years the Committee has reported upon but one investigation. It reported on certain phases of the adulterated paint industry. No doubt there was good use for such a report. But adulterated paint is no special training for an investigation of sugar and coal shortages.

There is nothing here to explain why Mr. Lodge should insist upon taking coal and sugar away from the committees that ordinarily handle them, and giving them over to a committee that ordinarily handles very little of anything. One has to look further to find the essential fact.

The fact, namely, that Mr. Hoover's most bitter enemy in the Senate was chairman of one committee and one committee only: the Committee on Manufactures. It was this chairman, Mr. Reed of Missouri, who delayed the passage of the food-control bill until he had the public's patience frayed, and who described governmental regulation of food stocks in war time as "a power such as no Cæsar ever employed over a conquered province in the bloodiest days of Rome's bloody despotism."

Why Mr. Lodge chose to put his investigation into Mr. Reed's hands may be explained in two ways. One explanation rests on Mr. Lodge's friendly interest in the administration. He wanted the public to be kept from getting the impression that anyone was going to be whitewashed. So he ignored the committee which would naturally have jurisdiction over coal and the committee which would naturally have jurisdiction over sugar, and went all the way around to the committee with the most hostile chairman he could find, a chairman who could never be suspected of wanting to whitewash anything that was part or parcel of the Food Administration. That is one explanation. Those who believe Mr. Lodge capable of a friendly interest in the administration are entitled to use it.

The other explanation attributes Mr. Lodge's tortuous path and hostile goal as coming less from a desire to befriend Mr. Hoover and the Democratic administration than to demonstrate the one unnecessary and the other incompetent. Mr. Lodge is known not to be a great believer in government, after government begins to trespass on what is regarded as legitimate private competition. While the food-control bill was being discussed he stated that he was "against the power of fixing prices on either maximum or minimum." He also stated that "so far as possible we ought to leave the course of trade and the natural economic laws unmeddled with"—a theory which, though sanctioning artificial tariff barriers, would forbid a government to regulate prices of essential commodities. At least that is the inference to be drawn from Mr. Lodge's action at the time governmental control over coal prices was originally proposed. For, with such Senators as Mr. Penrose and Mr. Warren, Mr. Brandegee and Mr. McLean—twelve in all, and twelve as reactionary as the Senate holds—Mr. Lodge voted against the proposal giving the government its present power to determine the maximum price at which coal shall sell in a period of national emergency.

There is accordingly nothing improbable about the assumption that Mr. Lodge is, at the present time, still interested in the policy of governmental price-fixing. Or, in fact, that he is quite as much interested in having that policy shown to be in good measure responsible for a shortage of sugar and coal as he is actually discovering that a shortage of sugar and coal exists. That Mr. Lodge is also content to have the investigation shade off into a court-martial is demonstrated in the manner in which he, with a majority of the Committee members, have tolerated certain unusual methods of inquiry. The method of calling witnesses is illustrative. Most publicity naturally goes to the opening days of any investigation. In those days the newspapers consider all testimony novel enough to be "featured," and news thus featured makes a sharp impression upon a public that has not been prepared for any revelations. It is the custom of Congressional investigations, accordingly, to summon first those government officials who may in any way be concerned, rather than call them later and force them to make what may seem to the public a purely defensive rebuttal. Even in the operatic "peace leak investigation" of last January, Mr. Lansing was given opportunity to establish a case before the tireless Mr. Lawson undertook to destroy it. But in the present investigation the method has been varied. Not only did the Committee fail to give Mr. Hoover a first hearing, but it called instead the one witness whose testimony was most reasonably certain to be hostile. Moreover, when Mr. Hoover appeared on the third day of the investigation, the Committee ignored his request for an immediate hearing. And meantime it established the silly practice of compelling counsel for the Food Administration to relay its cross-examination via one of the Committee members, preferably via Mr. Reed. This may be a good way to discredit cross-examination, but it is a poor way to find out whether there is a sugar shortage.

It would be a mistake to attribute to Mr. Lodge all responsibility for the type of investigation which is now being made into the administration and into Mr. Hoover and now and then into sugar and coal. Democratic leaders in the Senate could not have dodged an investigation, but they could have made certain that it would be conducted not by a body which had its own conclusions to exploit but by some agency which could reap whatever profit there is in a Congressional inquiry. It would also be a mistake to think that the sugar and coal investigation is part of an organized Republican attack. It is rather one of those attacks in which the majority is indifferent to the purpose and methods of a small non-partisan disgruntled minority. Mr. Lodge is one of that minority. So is Mr. Reed. Temporarily they have joined forces. It is hard to see how the union will have an effect on the sugar and coal shortages. But it will have a considerable effect on almost everything else. For the Committee on Manufactures will not set the best example for the many other Congressional investigating committees at work on war problems.

C. M.

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Books and Things

SINCE the Turn of the Screw, which fastened me in the habit of reading as it came out every new book by Henry James, I have had several moments of reaction against his way of looking at life and his way of writing English. In the Cage gave me one of these moments. Reading it was like watching Henry James watching through a knot-hole somebody who was watching somebody else through a knot-hole. The Sacred Fount, to take another example, was a book to shake the faith of the faithful. For weeks after reading it I hoped and prayed I might never again be exposed to novels of country house adultery. Another moment of rebellion is the present, when I have been reading The Middle Years, not the story but the fragment of autobiography named after the story. I am glad it has been published (Scribner's, $1.25 net), there are things in it one would on no account have missed, portraits in different scales of Swinburne, Renan, Browning, Lewes, George Eliot, Tennyson, Mrs. Greville, Lady Waterford. But it makes me feel that Henry James took with him to England, as a young man of twenty-five, a state of mind which would have been forgivable if it had been temporary, and which lasted forever after. On a March day in 1870 he arrived at Liverpool in a condition of anxious receptivity, and so he continued until the end. Like Coventry Patmore's lover, who kept on suing and wooing long after "all is won that hope can ask," Henry James kept up his nervous courtship of England. For years he and England lived together on what, had the anxious husband been able to remember that he was no longer bridegroom or fiancé on probation, might have been terms of placid connubial friendship, but he never got used to her. Something about her, something storied or even something finished and fashionable, some attitude which marked her as belonging to a greater world than his, provoked him ever to pursue. England lived at her ease with Henry James: he lived with her in an eternal changeless sacred twitter.

"This doom of inordinate exposure to appearances, aspects, images, every protrusive item almost in the great beheld sum of things, I regard in other words as having settled upon me once for all while I observed for instance that in England the plate of buttered muffin and its cover were sacredly set upon the slop-bowl after hot water had been ingenuously poured into the same, and had seen that circumstance in a perfect cloud of accompaniments." Trop de beau style, says a French critic, after reading one of Zola's heavy-laden descriptions of a table set for luncheon, trop de beau style pour des prunes. So in this case. Too fine and laborious a receptivity, too rich a cloud of accompaniments, for a plate of buttered muffin. From the perusal of such a passage I rise and shout something about "the need of a world of men for me." When I find Henry James remembering the exact number of times he had been asked out to breakfast in the United States of America, up to March, 1870, I exclaim: "Teach him rather to forget." To Henry James, my irritation tells me, life was too much "the great adventure of sensibility," and too little anything else. In London "the commonest street-vista was a fairly heart-shaking contributive image." In London, after one of his adventures in sensibility, he "cherished for the rest of the day the peculiar quality of my vibration." Now, though I yield to none, and so forth, there are moments, and this is one of them, when passages like these make me long to pack my grip and go to some place where men do not cherish or discriminate their vibrations, where men do things and think only for the sake of doing them, where they butt one another off the sidewalk without apology, where they eat pie and steak for breakfast. Take me out of this world of sensibility, I cry, take me into the world where men hustle and loaf and spit on the floor.

And the way of writing? Don't let us hunt out something special, let us take what we happen to find, not forgetting of course that Henry James did not revise his first dictated draft of The Middle Years: "What was the secret of the force of that suggestion?—which was not, I may say, to be invalidated, to my eyes, by the further observation of cases and conditions. Was it that the enormous 'pull' enjoyed at every point of the general surface the stoutness of the underlying belief in what was behind all surfaces?" Compare these, which for their dictating author are rather plain, with two sentences, written about the time of which Henry James is speaking, by another observer of English life: "Your middle class man thinks it the highest pitch of development and civilization when his letters are carried twelve times a day from Islington to Camberwell, and from Camberwell to Islington, and if railway trains run to and fro between them every quarter of an hour. He thinks it is nothing that the trains only carry him from an illiberal, dismal life at Islington to an illiberal, dismal life at Camberwell; and the letters only tell him that such is the life there." Or go back from Matthew Arnold's prose, back a hundred years to the prose of Fielding. Leaving all other biographers who have told the lives of great and worthy persons, Fielding turns to Pamela and to Colley Cibber's Apology for the Life of Colley Cibber: "But I pass by these and many others to mention two books lately published, which represent an admirable pattern of the amiable in either sex. The former of these, which deals in male virtue, was written by the great person himself, who lived the life he hath recorded, and is by many thought to have lived such a life only in order to write it."

You may tell me, and perhaps I have sense enough to see for myself, that Henry James had more difficult things to say than either Fielding or Matthew Arnold. But in his later years he grew fonder and fonder of saying his simplest things in a manner appropriate only to his subtlest. Newman's simple things are said simply, like this: "For myself, lest I appear in any way to be shrinking from a determinate judgment on the claims of some of those miracles and relics, which Protestants are so startled at, and to be hiding particular questions in what is vague and general, I will avow distinctly, that, putting out of the question the hypothesis of unknown laws of nature (that is, of the professed miracle being not miraculous), I think it impossible to withstand the evidence for the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius at Naples, and for the motion of the eyes of the pictures of the Madonna in the Roman states." And Hume even when he is packing much thought into few words, is almost always, I suppose, as clear as this: "No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony is of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish." It is in the eighteenth century, most of all, that the style of The Middle Years makes one want to stay. I believe I'll stay there for awhile, reading Swift and Goldsmith and Defoe, until I have had time to relapse into homesickness for the modern, until I miss the "inspiration caught from subtler hues."

P. L.

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The Cobbler of Paris

THE composer who would borrow another's ideas is like the woman who would borrow another's virtue. It is possible, it is even praiseworthy, to affect the manners and the appearance of the virtuous; competent technique, like circumspect social behavior, can be acquired by sympathetic imitation of good models, and is much to be desired. But the ultimate pearl of personal worth is too intimate, too firmly encased in the body and the soul of the possessor, to be filched or lent.

Now Henri Rabaud, whose opera, Marouf, the Cobbler of Cairo, was the first of the season's new works at the Metropolitan Opera House, is adept, above most composers of his day, at affecting the manners and the appearance, that is to say the technique and style, of the virtuous among musicians. But it does not appear that he possesses any trace of that positive germinal faculty which we call genius, not even in the restricted degree in which minor men like Chausson and Lekeu may be said to have possessed it. He must borrow wholly from others. But since it is possible to borrow only what is transferable, his work is compounded wholly of technique and style without the one authentic virtue of musical ideas.

The more's the pity, because Marouf should have been capital entertainment. The cobbler of Cairo who squabbled with his wife, fled from his angry Cadi, passed himself off on the Sultan of Khaitan as a rich merchant, married the Sultan's daughter, fled with her when the imposture was exposed, discovered a magic ring with the genii thereunto appertaining, commanded his fabulous caravan to appear in the nick of time, and saved himself from death to live happily ever afterwards, this is a figure to divert weary war-worn peoples, as he has diverted the public of Paris in many a performance at the Opéra Comique. Those foolish magic rings which bristle from the soil of the Arabian Nights are a very wish-fulfilment in these times, when all peoples are invoking and expecting caravans of magical soldiers with genii to direct them. The facile conjuring feats which music, of all the arts, is best fitted to perform are here abundantly demanded. The most ingratiating qualities of the composer are called into play. The splendors of light and color which the theatre, that house of wonders, is best capable of creating are here invoked. The genii of the theatre should leap in response to the summons.

But Rabaud, in spite of an unusually capable libretto, can never warm to his work. He has conscientiously imitated the most excellent models, even as he did in his second symphony, repeatedly played in New York this season and last. The thin delineative line of Massenet, the agreeable exoticism of old Félicien David, of Lalo, and of a host of other clever Frenchmen, the peppery ballet rhythms of Borodine and Rimsky-Korsakoff, even the sonorous emotional harmonies of Wagner and César Franck, he lays hands on all of them with no end of deftness and skill. But never once comes that authoritative voice, as when the true son of the muses pronounces his "fiat musica." Nor does the dull, distracting, monotonously garish scenery, cobbled according to the age-old tradition, ever for a moment suggest the lustrous and languorous colors of the mystic east.

Such a resumé would imply that Rabaud, with the assimilative talent of the virtuoso, has the creative faculty of the merest dabbler. And this is exactly what is meant. But how, you will ask, could a man so feebly endowed produce an opera at all worthy of acceptance by the Opéra Comique, and indeed a work acknowledged one of the most popular in many a Parisian year? The answer is that official Paris is a peculiar place, which models many things, and opera in particular, after its own image. Musical Paris is, in short, nothing less than a closely guarded secret society, in which the musicians flatter the managers, and the critics flatter the musicians, and the managers flatter the critics, while together they sip tea with the fashionable world and present a solid front to the musical zealots. Now there are a certain number of operas to be produced from time to time, for the state subsidy to the Opéra and the Opéra Comique requires that these houses shall stage a specified number of "acts of new operas" by French composers each season. The question is merely, which operas shall be chosen. The secret society manages that quite smoothly, and nobody need worry, unless perchance the revolutionary outsider trying to break in. But again, you ask how those who happen to be socially acceptable to the society are able with such uniformity to master the difficult art of operatic writing sufficiently to pass muster at all. Nothing is simpler. The "art" of writing operas which can pass muster in Paris is not an art but a science. The requirements for successful operas are, after many years, so clearly defined by tradition that any one possessing a modicum of talent can approximate them, provided he is willing to exercise sufficient industry. The Parisian composer has mastered the science of writing acceptable operas as completely as the American congressman the science of effecting his own re-election.

In this Paris, the innovator, who is sometimes a genius, and the genius, who is always an innovator, have a difficult time. Books now record the struggles of Chabrier and D'Indy to break into the sacred Opéra. Intrigue, it is understood, thwart such men on every hand, and when intrigue has been foiled the claque is still in reserve, Ernest Bloch experienced, with his admirable opera "Macbeth," the frigidity of Paris to the outsider. Indeed, so discouraging is the atmosphere that such distinguished composers as Debussy, Ravel and Dukas have written but one work a piece for the opera house, and men like Schmitt, Roussel, Duparc and Casella have never bothered with it at all. In official operatic Paris genius is rebuffed. But superficial talents, like Godard and Messager, found themselves quite at home there; and more distinguished musicians, like Gounod and Saint-Saëns, fell into listless mediocrity after some association with it. Only the supreme operatic aptitude of Massenet preserved to it any repute among foreign musicians, while Debussy and Charpentier overcame it by transcending it altogether.

Out of this official Paris, the Paris on which Romain Rolland persistently turned his critical guns, a few operas have trickled to America, among them such frauds as the Quo Vadis of Noguès, the Monna Vanna of Février, and the Messaline of Isidoro de Lara (né Cohen). Marouf comes as the latest of the list, markedly better than the others because it is the work of a far abler man imitating much better models. Rabaud is distinguished as a teacher, and clever and resourceful as a technician, thanks to long and arduous training. Because of this, and in spite of the feebleness of his creative powers, he has been able to cobble an opera in Paris which is acceptable to the charmed circle and is even capable of bringing some little pleasure to audiences abroad. Yet while such operas are being cobbled by the dozen every year, by men quite without creative talent, composers like Dukas, Ravel, Roussel and Schmitt have no stomach for the work. And while the

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Metropolitan is occasionally producing them or their like, works like L'Heure Espagnole, La Jota, L'Ouragan and Bérénice go unheard.

There are many who like to believe that the war is changing all this. Searching for a silver lining to the black cloud they can imagine that the cobbling tradition in Parisian opera will vanish before the stern cold wind of reality that is to come, that genius will emerge into free activity, untrammeled by intrigue and claque.

H. K. M.

The Ways of War

The Ways of War, by T. M. Kettle, with a Memoir by his wife, Mary S. Kettle. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. $2.25.

A CLOUD of almost indescribable feeling is aroused by this memorial of T. M. Kettle. If it is by symbols that men are most greatly influenced, the death of Kettle at Guillamont, a lieutenant in the Dublin Fusiliers, is a symbol of more than Irish significance in the war. A death in itself, what is it? One of the most casual and commonplace accidents in the field—a wound, a cough of blood, the ebb of everything, the end. No countryman of Bernard Shaw's needs to be told how unheroic the disaster is, how unlike the fifth act of a play. Rupert Brooke gives his life to his country. How? By meningitis following a carbuncle on his upper lip. That has more the accent of piteous circumstance than the gallantry of a charge. But the most sensitive human being escapes cynicism by remembering the selection, the intention, which preceded the indignity of battle. In childbirth there is also considerable indignity for those who limit themselves to the facts.

What makes Kettle's death significant, with that significance we so bravely borrow for mortality, is the place from which he came to it out of the social and political world. Had anyone said to Kettle in July, 1914, that he would die a lieutenant in the Dublin Fusiliers, the irony would have seemed inordinate. In July, 1914, he was busy buying rifles in Belgium for the National Volunteers. Mock-heroic as that mission was, in the militaristic sense, it was at any rate the mission of a man who had made so important a choice for his country as to take the risks of the contraband traffic in arms. The son of a leading Parnellite Nationalist, himself a Catholic Nationalist who had quite normally taken his place as a member of parliament before he had become a professor of economics in the new state-aided Roman Catholic university, there was nothing about him to indicate the degree of sympathy with the British empire that a commission in the army suggests. It was not so much that Kettle was out of sympathy with the empire. He was, to put it bluntly, out of the empire. And the strange paradox of the war, the paradox of his death in a British uniform, was that a climax in political feeling should have completely brought him in.

Ireland out of the empire—that may seem a fantastic account of his position. To debate it were impossible without lighting up every old political cicatrix in every Catholic Nationalist's heart. It is enough to say that religious and national prejudice builds a mountain between peoples, and at the steep side of that slowly eroding mountain T. M. Kettle dwelt. "One of the most brilliant figures in the Young Ireland and the Young Europe of his time," as the prefatory note describes him, he still identified himself with the majority of his people, a people unsatisfactorily ruled, not yet allowed to rule themselves. A Catholic Irishman, there was no function for him within the imperial economy which would not impoverish his national present and estrange him from his past. "One of the most brilliant figures in Young Ireland," yes, but not seriously in Europe. The pathos and heroism of his nationalism, as against such nationalism as Shaw's, was its vindication in the not unimportant realm of conduct, involving a costly exile from the intellectual Europe in which he properly belonged. In Dublin, as the memoir so frankly states, he was only half himself. And his writing shows well enough that, favorably environed, he would have had a development very different, would have been one of the moving and witty and superb writers of his age.

Yet when the tug came Kettle promptly enlisted and went recruiting for England, learned soldiering, did his stint in the France that he had known and appreciated, stuck to his regiment in spite of staff opportunities, saw action, led bravely, and died. Outside the glory of it, which throbs in Mrs. Kettle's admirable memoir, there is the poignant exposition of it in these articles; the quick extension of nationalism to Belgium, the valiant heady Catholicism, the romance of selflessness, the sumptuous eloquence of partisanship, the penetrating hatred of war's infidelity to humanism, the devoted tribute to common soldiers, the growing alarm that politicians could manipulate consecrated causes, the words written on the eve of death—"If I live I mean to spend the rest of my life working for perpetual peace. I have seen war, and faced modern artillery, and I know what an outrage it is against simple men."

"To be above passion is to be below humanity." With these words, and words like them, Kettle embraced the cause of the Allies. "The Great War was in its origin a Great Crime, and the documents are there to prove it." "The unchallengeable fact remains that while democracy was seeking a solution in terms of peace, 'the old German God' forced it in terms of war." "Russia has her vile tyrannies. But from all Russian literature there comes an immense and desolating sob of humility and self-reproach. Great Britain has not yet liquidated her account with Ireland, nor altogether purified her relations with India and Egypt. But Great Britain does not, at any rate, throw aside all plain, pedestrian Christian standards as rubbish. In the Rhineland, too . . . But all the central thought of Germany has been for a generation corrupt. It has been foul with the odor of desired shambles." And the last sentences of a despatch from Brussels, August 5th, 1914, "It is impossible not to be with Belgium in the struggle. It is impossible any longer to be passive. Germany has thrown down a well-considered challenge to all the deepest forces of our civilization. War is hell, but is only a hell of suffering, not a hell of dishonor. And through it, over its flaming coals, Justice must walk, were it on bare feet."

So much of statecraft is cynical and diabolic, from the standpoint of human decency, that many fine men become simply anthropomorphic about it and hate the state. The best of Irishmen, "agin' the gover'ment," have inclined to this view. Since time began, if evolution means anything, the resistance of order to liberty has been resolute, with order ever tending to make liberty glamorous, to handicap legitimate growth and change, to skim power from the men who create it, to levy tribute as a toll on mere existence, to cheat the bees of their honey. There is nothing diabolic in statecraft, I suppose, that isn't as old as the hills. If the conditions of "the great society" are new, requiring

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a new outfit of political devices for stimulating loyalty, the game of stimulating loyalty must still be a very old one, as old as any so-called "voluntary" movement on the part of any great mass. But once the mass becomes very vast and heterogeneous, very extended and loose, the artificiality of political devices shows up horribly, especially if their end is warfare and their means a wholesale employment of patriotically conscripted youth.

To die for a "tradition," a "principle," a "group of ideas," when your next-door neighbors have obviously different traditions and principles and groups of ideas—it is a requirement that goes astonishingly and absurdly contrary to the whole private tendency of modern times. Perhaps that tendency, which I take to be individuation, has only been superficial—a matter of numbered seats instead of a scramble, individual newspapers instead of a bellman, multiple forks and knives, personal books, personal rooms, personal bath-tubs, personal locomotives, personal inflections in everything physical, rather than a genuine intimate and scrupulous consultation of personal natures and wills. Whether superficial or deep, it has been the dominant note of free communities in our generation—a note, from the standpoint of the recruiting sergeant, that cannot too soon be quelled. To subdue personality and personal preference is the function of the recruiting sergeant. To produce a regiment is his object. And if the "noble cause" is not conspicuous when he starts on his mission—well, as General O'Ryan of New York so wittily observes, a "noble cause" can be produced by any government at any time. The individual may have been pursuing "liberty," detesting regimentation. Suddenly, in the presence of an enemy, he is called upon to recognize the entity dictated by statecraft, to enlist or be flayed. His "noble cause" may, actually, be declared the very individuation and liberty he has striven for. His first obligation, for all that, is to defer his dividend of self. He has to commit himself, body and bones, to the statecraft that has so often betrayed him, and to give up that precious protestantism which made him feel a soldier of life. He has to espouse self-sacrifice, to admit solidarity, to pool his preferences. He has, in other words, to come in and be good.

With this surrender, this mighty abnegation, in mind, there is a weight of import in the last words that Kettle speaks before the veil descends. The scourge of war he characterizes. "When the times comes to write down in every country a plain record of it, with its wounds and weariness, and flesh-stabbing, and bone-pulverizing, and lunacies, and rats and lice and maggots, and all the crawling festerment of battlefields, two landmarks in human progress will be reached. The world will for the first time understand the nobility, beyond all phrase, of soldiers, and it will understand also the foulness, beyond all phrase, of those who compel them into war." But the bond of war he emphasizes. "The New Army attested to die, if need be, for the public law of Europe." And he speaks the last word on war aims. "Either this is on our part a war into which we were forced by aggressive militarism . . . or else it is a mere struggle for domination between greedy Powers. . . . The inner disruption of the Central Alliance is never very far from practical politics. . . . But consent to the substitution of 'trade' for 'honor' as our device, and mark the malign transformation. . . . The armies, to whatever new deflection their inspiration be submitted, will fight their unwavering way to victory. But it will be a victory tainted with ambiguous and selfish ends. History will write of us that we began nobly, but that our purpose corrupted. The Great War for freedom will not, indeed, have been waged in vain; that is already decided: but it will have but half kept its promises. Blood and iron will have been once more established as the veritable masters of men, and nothing will open before the world but a vista of new wars."

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I received a letter from France this week that said, "Raymond Asquith lies buried at Guillamont on the Somme on the bloodstained road to Bapaume, being killed August or September about the same time and place as Tommy Kettle whose grave I searched for but did not find." From that unknown grave I am glad that Kettle speaks in the end not of Belgium, nor of Ireland, but of the power of the state, the treacheries of statecraft, the invincible significance of war aims. His blood is a pledge to democracy against "the terrorists of 'patriotism,'" his last courage a moral courage in the name of the great liberalism for which he died. F. H.

The Bagdad Railway

The War and the Bagdad Railway, by Morris Jastrow, Jr. Philadelphia: The J. B. Lippincott Company. $1.50.

ARE we fighting about the Bagdad railway? Not now. Whatever the object of the war in 1914, its object now is plainly the overthrow of a governmental system that can conduct war as the Germans have conducted this war. What is to become of the Bagdad railway few of us care just now; the question of transcendent importance is, what is to become of German military autocracy. To paraphrase Professor Jastrow's analysis, the war of 1917 is not the

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same as the war of 1914. By her official employment of policies of terrorism, Germany raised up against herself the democratic peoples in succession to the rival imperialisms she challenged at the outset.

Nevertheless, the war of autocracy against humanity did arise, by a not unnatural development, out of the desperate conflict of imperialistic purposes and that imperialistic conflict arose out of the Bagdad railway. Since 1899 all Europe knew that a world war might well result from the clashing of interests in Asia Minor. And since our own entry into the war, all America, with the exception of those few who went blind studying red and yellow and white and green books, has become aware of the fact that the ultimate cause of the war lay in Asia Minor. All Europe and most of America know that the question of Asia Minor will have to be settled, if the world is to enjoy permanent peace. So much we had learned from Chéradame, and the host of publicists who have followed his lead. We can afford to run through the argument once more with Professor Jastrow, who is hard to match for brevity and clearness, although he adds little that is new to the discussion of the present problem.

As an Oriental scholar, Professor Jastrow is singularly well equipped to set forth in the light of history the conditions that have made Asia Minor such a disastrous breeder of strife, and this is in fact his most interesting contribution. Asia Minor is in essence a bridge over which the hungry and barbarous peoples must pass in their forays against the peoples that are replete and civilized. Woe to the civilized if the hungry control the bridge. The cardinal point in the military policy of the rich empires of Mesopotamia was the control of Asia Minor beyond the Cilician gates. If they relaxed their military efforts, the Hittites from the Anatolian plateau swarmed down upon them. It was a war that could not be ended once for all, since one wild race after another was sure to appear on the Anatolian bridge, from the Thracian hills or the Russian steppes or the dry plains beyond the Caucasus. Egypt, too, knew the menace of the Anatolian plateau, and under energetic rulers made buffer dependencies against the Hittites out of Palestine and Syria.

It is an interesting fact that the first imperialistic enterprise of the Persians was the reduction of the Anatolian plateau. And their failure to hold it against Alexander was the doom of their empire, as later the failure of the Arabians to hold Anatolia against Turk and Mongol cost them the control of the Mohammedan world. The Crusaders' Kingdom of Jerusalem fell because Anatolia remained true to the Prophet. Jerusalem is once more in Christian hands; to what permanent gain, if Anatolia remains unregenerate?

What the Germans tried to do was to use the Anatolian bridge as Alexander and the Romans used it, as an offensive approach to the rich and weak east. Controlling Anatolia they could control Mesopotamia; controlling the whole route from Constantinople to the Persian gulf, they would flank Egypt and train their cannon on India. The British, as trustees for India and Egypt, are striving to control the bridge as far as the Cilician gates, following the strategy pursued by Sargon of Babylonia and Thutmose of Egypt about four thousand years ago.

It is the business of the statesmen of today to put an end to the series of baleful aggressions conducted across the bridge of Asia Minor. So long as there are differences in potential between west and east, currents are destined to flow along the line from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf. But these need not be currents of war and exploitation. Open the road from Constantinople to Bagdad and beyond, but let its control be not German nor British, but international. Send over the road to the east men from all the countries of Europe, but send missionaries, teachers, engineers, not adventurers after profit and plunder. Above all, send students, to bring home to the west the best that the east has to give. This is the solution of the problem of Asia Minor that Professor Jastrow offers.

And the more you reflect on it, the more clearly you see that it is the only possible solution. The backward regions of the world are a menace to peace, so long as they are not held in strong hands. But the hands of the strongest nation weaken in time, and the menace is again upon the world. Turkey held Asia Minor and Mesopotamia strongly some centuries ago. She held them for purposes of aggression and wrought great evil in her strength, but many times greater evil in her later period of weakness. Were she now divided and distributed among the stronger nations, all would be well for a little time. Subjected to the control of a group of nations pledged to foster coöperation between east and west, and to hold the land in trust for the nations now existing only as nuclei under the Sultan's oppression, Asia Minor may be removed for all time from the category of causes of war.

A. J.

Recent Publications

How Germany Does Business. Chapters on Expert and Finance Methods, by Paul Pensac Gourvitch. New York: B. W. Huebsch. $1.00.

CERTAIN prepossessions about Germany's astounding success in foreign trade previous to the war vanish before the array of facts presented in this brief and admirable book of exposition on Germany's expert and finance methods. The naïve assumption is that the government subsidized the unprofitable ventures and encouraged the growth of the merchant marine, even at a temporary loss, all with a view to future trade domination. This assumption is true, but its importance has been grossly exaggerated. Nine-tenths of Germany's success was due to her application of scientific methods of business. She created a class of small importers by careful study of variations in the tastes of the foreign consumer. She was almost recklesssly liberal in opening credit accounts with unknown customers, but by clever manipulation of local banking credits she practically secured herself in advance against the buyer's possible failure. She stabilized prices for the importer by introduction of highly specialized instruments of banking, by herself taking over the problems of custom duties, international law, freight and insurance rates, etc. She knew the correct publicity for every foreign country. In a word, everything was made easy for the buyer and Germany created a demand which she was, of course, in a position to satisfy. Her domestic industry, moreover, was really organized to a higher point of productive efficiency than any other country's in the world. She understood and had scientifically classified mail-order rates, utilization of by-products, coordination of the home and the foreign market. Nothing was overlooked or forgotten. And her scheme of "economic penetration" was, on the side of international finance, equally scientific in its ways and means, until, as in Italy, the numbers of German joint stock companies was so large that "there is not one corporation which is not under German control, directly, indirectly or at least partly." It would be idle to deny that there was not a benevolent side

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